Multilingual Prospective Jurors: Assessing California Standards Twenty Years after \u3ci\u3eHernandez v. New York\u3c/i\u3e by Ali, Farida
Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 4
Spring 2013
Multilingual Prospective Jurors: Assessing




This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Farida Ali, Multilingual Prospective Jurors: Assessing California Standards Twenty Years after Hernandez v. New York, 8 Nw. J. L. & Soc.
Pol'y. 236 (2013).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol8/iss2/4
Copyright 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 8 (Spring 2013)  
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 
Multilingual1 Prospective Jurors: 
Assessing California Standards Twenty Years after 







This Article explores the ramifications of linguistically motivated peremptory 
challenges against multilingual prospective jurors in California in the twenty years since 
such challenges were legitimatized under Hernandez v. New York. An examination of 
state and federal case law reveals that the pretext analysis for reviewing Hernandez-
based peremptory challenges remains both an arbitrary and a flawed tool that California 
courts have, nevertheless, been reluctant to second-guess. This problem is particularly 
acute in California because it is home to the largest multilingual population in the United 
States, with 43% of Californians speaking a language other than English. California, 
therefore, provides an exemplary context for a case study of these issues and its impact 
on multilingual prospective jurors. However, it is important to recognize that the issues 
raised by language-based peremptory challenges arise in many other jurisdictions, and 
potentially affect a large number of Americans throughout the country. 
The Article discusses the manner in which Hernandez-based peremptory 
challenges, deference to lower court decisions allowing these challenges, and 
discriminatory and ineffective state laws are interdependent, mutually reinforcing, and 
combine to render multilingual individuals proportionately underrepresented in jury 
service. The Article suggests that this problem signals a need to develop and institute 
measures to protect multilinguals’ exercise of their right to jury participation. Among the 
recommendations offered are the embellishment and refinement of strategies available to 
parties objecting to linguistically based peremptory challenges. These changes would 
help make California’s framework for responding to Hernandez more concrete, more 
effective, and less discriminatory. The Article also proposes changes that the California 
legislature, judges, courts, and litigating parties can make to reduce Hernandez’s 
discriminatory impact and promote greater jury participation for multilinguals. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Linguistic diversity is a fact of life in the United States today, as it has been since 
colonial times.2 According to a recent census, one-in-five Americans speaks at least one 
foreign language at home.3 The constant entry of immigrants adds not only to the number 
of foreign-language speakers, but also to the diversity of languages spoken in the United 
States. Inevitably, such diversity brings a variety of challenges, including issues that 
affect jurisprudence. Among these issues is the number of cases in which parties use 
peremptory challenges to remove potential multilingual jurors.  
In Hernandez v. New York,4 the ruling commonly cited to support these peremptory 
strikes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that peremptory challenges were justified against 
                                                      
2 See Philip Martin & Elizabeth Midgley, Immigration to the United States, POPULATION BULLETIN 1, 14–
15 (June 1999). In the 16th and 17th centuries, English colonists established the groundwork for the society 
that would become the United States. Id. at 14. These colonists expanded their territory in North America 
when they “superimposed” their population on Native Americans and seized control of Dutch, French, and 
Spanish settlements. Id. The importation of African slaves until the early 1800s further added to the 
colonial population. Id. After the Mexican War ended in 1848, Mexicans in California, New Mexico, and 
Texas were integrated into the population. Id. Between 1820 and 1840, German and Irish migrants began 
arriving in North America in substantial numbers, and starting around 1880 several hundred thousand 
Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian migrant laborers began settling in the western states. Id. at 15. The 
variety of backgrounds, cultures, and languages that these groups possessed ultimately contributed to the 
diversity of the United States. 
3 Hyon B. Shin & Robert A. Kominski, Language Use in the United States: 2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY REPORTS, 2 (Apr. 2010) (80% of the U.S. population speaks only English, 
while 20% speaks English and one or more other languages). 
4 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
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bilingual speakers of English and Spanish on the basis of their bilingualism.5 The Court 
recognized the close connection between language and race or national origin.6 However, 
the Court held that the strikes were adequately explained as a precautionary measure 
against the risk that jurors would ignore the official English translation of testimony 
provided by the trial court.7 Employing a traditional and rigid nondiscrimination 
framework, the Court decided that the strikes did not intentionally target race and, 
therefore, did not violate the Constitution.8 This decision, albeit good law, has been 
roundly criticized over the years for allowing racism in jury selection and for promoting 
the widespread exclusion of multilingual jurors.9  
This Article argues that, in the twenty years since Hernandez, California state and 
federal courts have continued to play an important role in facilitating language-based 
exclusions that deny multilinguals their right to participate in jury service. This Article 
also argues that language-based exclusions deprive litigants and the courts of diverse 
juries that are demonstrably better decision makers who use balance and impartiality 
during deliberations. The Article further argues that if existing doctrine and practice 
remain unchanged, Batson will continue to allow reliance on language as a pretext for 
race in jury selection, thereby disenfranchising racial and linguistic minorities, and 
undermining public perception of integrity in the judicial process.  
The problem of language-based peremptory challenges is particularly acute in 
California because the state is home to the largest multilingual population in the United 
States, with 43% of Californians speaking a language other than English.10 California, 
therefore, provides an exemplary context for a case study of this issue and its impact on 
multilinguals. It is important to recognize, however, that the issues raised by language-
based peremptory challenges arise in many other jurisdictions, particularly in other states 
with a high percentage of multilinguals in their population, such as Texas (34%), New 
York (29%), Arizona (29%), New Jersey (28%), Nevada (27%), and Florida (26%).11 
Thus, although this Article focuses on the problem as it has unfolded in California, the 
exclusion of multilingual jurors is not merely a state or regional issue, but one that 
potentially affects a large number of Americans in many parts of the country. 
In exploring California’s framework for facilitating language-based exclusions, this 
Article examines the state’s standard of review, the pretext analysis,12 and how it has 
been applied in practice with respect to peremptory challenges of multilinguals. The 
Article also considers California statutes regarding language and jury selection, and 
                                                      
5 Id. at 361. 
6 Id. at 370–72. 
7 Id. at 361. 
8 Id. at 358–361. 
9 See Marina Hsieh, Language-Qualifying Juries to Exclude Bilingual Speakers, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1181, 
1206 (2001) (excluding multilingual jurors amounts to an exclusion of those most able to address the 
growing needs of our multilingual courts); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: 
Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
133, 133 (2001) (arguing the U.S. Supreme Court’s clumsy treatment of the bilingual juror reflects a 
fundamental deficiency in our legal system).  
10 Shin et al., supra note 3, at 9.  
11 Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 73. 
12 A pretextual analysis for linguistic discrimination requires the trial court to determine whether the 
striking party’s race-neutral explanation for disproportionately excluding potential jurors who speak a 
given language is a pretext for racial discrimination. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 354. 




whether they contribute to the attrition of linguistic minorities in voir dire. The Article 
suggests that California’s framework is seriously flawed and that, given the likelihood 
that peremptory challenges will continue as a fixture in jury selection, added measures 
are needed to protect multilinguals’ right to serve on juries.  
Part II of this Article focuses on the history of Hernandez v. New York. This review 
looks to the rationale of Hernandez, its standard of review, and its progeny, Johnson v. 
California. Part III considers the California Constitution and how it paved the way for 
Hernandez. Part IV considers California’s framework for removing potential jurors. 
Specifically, it examines California’s application of the pretext analysis for reviewing 
Hernandez-based peremptory challenges. Part V considers the implications of 
California’s pretext analysis with respect to multilinguals and discusses serious problems 
in this regard, including the likelihood that, when combined with existing California 
statutes, peremptory challenges further disenfranchise linguistic minorities. Part VI offers 
recommendations to judges, courts, and litigating parties for improving on the traditional 
pretext analysis. This section suggests that adding to, and refining, the existing methods 
available to an objecting party, who must develop a factual record showing linguistic 
discrimination, can make California’s framework more concrete and effective. Among 
the recommendations offered is the adoption of a Second Circuit standard to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination. Part VI also proposes statutory changes to the 
California legislature that would limit the impact of Hernandez on linguistic minorities. 
Finally, Part VI proposes a jury instruction to California courts that acknowledges and 
incorporates the linguistic experience of multilingual jurors.  
 
II. THE HISTORY OF LANGUAGE-BASED CHALLENGES 
  
 
A. Hernandez v. New York’s Rationale 
 
Hernandez v. New York involved Dionisio Hernandez, who was convicted of 
attempted murder in Brooklyn, New York, a jurisdiction with a large multilingual 
population.13 At Hernandez’s trial, the prosecution used peremptory challenges to 
disqualify bilingual jurors, citing hesitation by the jurors during voir dire when they were 
asked whether they could disregard direct testimony in Spanish and heed only the English 
translation of the court interpreter.14 Hernandez’s attorney protested that this was a ruse 
to keep Latinos off the jury who might be sympathetic to his client.15 The prosecutor 
countered that he was not convinced the jurors would be able to follow the translation 
offered by the court interpreter, and that this inability could give those jurors an undue 
influence over the jury.16 While the prosecutor admitted that after further questioning the 
jurors said they could follow the interpreter, the trial judge accepted the prosecutor’s 
“race-neutral” explanation. In a six-to-three decision, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
with the trial judge.17  
                                                      
13 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355–56. 
14 Id. at 356. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 356–57. 
17 Id. at 353, 356. 
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According to the plurality opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, while racial 
discrimination in jury selection has long been understood to be a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause,18 excluding bilingual jurors is not unconstitutional.19 Justice Kennedy 
suggested that language classifications merely divide potential jurors into people who 
would be able to accept official court translations at face value, and those who would 
not.20 That such challenges inevitably exclude a disproportionate number of multilinguals 
is not dispositive.21 So long as the explanation is not inherently discriminatory, it would 
not be considered race-based as a matter of law.22 
B. Batson v. Kentucky: The Standard of Review 
In determining whether the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to disqualify 
multilingual jurors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court applied the 
three-pronged test established in Batson v. Kentucky,23 a landmark decision forbidding 
prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely because of 
their race.24 The first step of the test requires the objecting party to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination.25 Next, the burden shifts to the striking party, who must put forth 
a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.26 The Supreme Court cautioned 
that in determining whether the striking party has satisfied the requirements of Batson’s 
second step, a court must keep in mind that the Batson decision rests on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which means that peremptory strikes 
are prohibited on the basis of race.27 The third step delegates to the trial court the duty of 
determining whether the objecting party established purposeful discrimination.28  
In designing this test, the Court in Batson accorded great deference to the 
prosecutor’s stated intent, holding that a “race-neutral” explanation meant an explanation 
based on something other than race.29 Any explanation proffered, so long as it does not 
specifically mention race, has therefore been deemed race-neutral by lower courts based 
on Justice Kennedy’s instruction in Hernandez that “unless a discriminatory intent is 
                                                      
18 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
19 Hernandez, 500 U.S. 361–62. 
20 Id. at 361 (observing that each group would include Latinos and non-Latinos). 
21 Id. at 359–60 (explaining disproportionate impact is inconclusive in determining race neutrality).  
22 Id. at 360. 
23 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
24 The Supreme Court later expanded the Batson limitation. See Powers 499 U.S. at 416 (applies to cross-
racial objections); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (applies to civil 
proceedings);  Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992) (applies to criminal proceedings); J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1994) (applies to gender); U.S. v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 
304 (2000) (applies to ethnic origin). 
25 Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.  
26 Id. 
27 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 409 (“[R]acial exclusion of prospective jurors violates the overriding command 
of the Equal Protection Clause, and ‘race-based exclusion is no more permissible at the individual petit jury 
stage than at the venire stage’. . . [T]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the 
State’s peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury 
solely by reason of their race, a practice that forecloses a significant opportunity to participate in civic 
life.”). 
28 Baston, 476 U.S. at 94–95.  
29 Id. 




inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race 
neutral.”30 
 Admittedly, the Court in Hernandez recognized that a challenge based on 
linguistic ability could be “inherently” race-neutral or discriminatory depending upon the 
context;31 however, it took no steps to protect linguistic minorities, revealing its failure to 
grasp the ramifications of the Hernandez decision.32 The dissent, by contrast, appeared to 
be more aware of these ramifications. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun, proposed a slightly different test. The dissenters argued that after the defense 
established a prima facie case in a Batson challenge, the striking party should have to 
provide an explanation that was not only race-neutral, but plausible and sufficiently 
persuasive.33  
The Hernandez prosecution’s concern with potential jurors’ ability to accept the 
official version of the testimony was neither plausible nor sufficiently persuasive 
because: (1) if the prosecutor’s concern was legitimate, he could have challenged the 
jurors for cause,34 and; (2) the prosecutor’s concern could have been remedied by a judge, 
who could have instructed the jurors that only the official English testimony would be 
considered as evidence, or otherwise provided the jury with limiting instructions.35 
Moreover, allowing language-based justifications for peremptory strikes is likely to lead 
to the disproportionate exclusion of multilingual jurors.36 In essence, the Hernandez 
decision afforded striking parties wide leeway in exercising peremptory challenges, 
allowing the use of language as a pretext for race, no matter how implausible, so long as 
there was arguably a facially race-neutral reason for the exclusions. The latitude thus 
permitted was excessive in Hernandez and, as a result, in a great many cases ever since. 
Nonetheless, it is unclear how different the dissent’s standard would have been in 
practice and effect since: (1) it also relies on the notion of “race-neutral”37 explanations, 
and; (2) it distinguishes between justifications that are pretextual (i.e., “unacceptable”) 
and those that are implausible (i.e., likely to be wrong because they are “insufficient to 
dispel [an] inference of racial animus”),38 but fails to provide examples of “plausible” 
reasons that would comport with its test. The dissenters’ reliance on jury instructions as a 
curative measure also presumes that jurors always follow the court’s instructions, and 
that these instructions are adequate and effectively address a juror’s inability or 
unwillingness to accept the official English version of testimony. However, it is 
                                                      
30 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. 
31 Id. at 371 (“It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a 
particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection 
analysis.”). 
32 See infra note 181.  
33 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
34 Id. at 379; see subpart IV(A) for a discussion of challenges “for cause”; see also Nancy S. Marder, 
Justice Stevens, The Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1715–17 (2006) 
(suggesting eliminating the peremptory challenge and expanding the “for cause” challenge to end 
discrimination during jury selection).   
35 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 379. 
36 Id. 
37 See Part V for a discussion of the problems inherent in the “race-neutral” test.  
38 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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important to recognize that jury instructions are not always curative,39 and might not have 
been helpful in Hernandez, because the jurors expressed their hesitancy following the 
Court’s instructions.40  
C. Johnson v. California: Clarifying the Batson Standard 
Fourteen years after the Hernandez decision, the Court granted certiorari in 
Johnson v. California 41 to resolve a conflict between the California Supreme Court and 
the Ninth Circuit regarding the standards applied to step one, or the prima facie prong, of 
the Batson analysis.42 Johnson involved the trial of a black man convicted of murder and 
assault of a young child.  During jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory 
challenges against all three black jury panelists.43 The defense objected to their 
disqualification on the basis of the Batson doctrine, but the trial judge overruled the 
objection.44 The judge held that the precedent established by the state in People v. 
Wheeler 45 required the defense to show a “strong likelihood” of racial discrimination at 
step one of the Batson test.46 The California Court of Appeal disagreed, however, and set 
aside the conviction,47 arguing that the “strong likelihood” standard was incorrect and 
that the proper standard was a “reasonable inference” of discrimination used by federal 
courts, including the Ninth Circuit.48 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reinstated the defendant’s conviction.49 It 
held that under Wheeler, the California standard would require showing a “strong 
likelihood,” or that it was “more likely than not,” that discrimination occurred in the use 
of peremptory challenges.50 The court defended its decision as consistent with Batson, 
which allowed states to establish their own procedures. Upon review, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court disagreed and interpreted Batson as only giving states “flexibility in 
                                                      
39 Jury instructions do not always have a curative effect because they may be incomprehensible or because 
jurors choose to disregard the law or the judge’s instructions. See Joseph Kimble, How to Mangle Court 
Rules and Jury Instructions, 8 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 39, 40 (2001) (“Jury instructions are notoriously 
incomprehensible to the public.”); James H. Gold, Voir Dire: Questioning Prospective Jurors on Their 
Willingness to Follow the Law, 60 IND. L. J. 163, 178 (1984) (“The assumption that jurors will follow the 
law appears to be based primarily on wishful thinking. While jurors do not have the right to disregard the 
judge’s instructions, they clearly have the power and are often willing to use it.”); see also infra subpart 
VI(D).  
40 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362. 
41 Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005).  
42 See id. at 166.  
43 See id. at 164–65. 
44 See id. 
45 People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 752 (Cal. 1978) (all-white jury convicted two black men of robbery as 
a result of the prosecution’s peremptory strikes and cause challenges to remove all black potential jurors 
during voir dire), modified, People v. Willis, 43 P.3d 130 (Cal. 2002); see also infra Part IV, subpart IV(A) 
for peremptory challenges and challenges for cause.  
46 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 164–65 (2005) (quoting People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 272 (Cal. 2003)).  
47  See id; People v. Johnson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (1st Dist. 2001). 
48 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 164–67. The California Court of Appeal based its decision on Wade v. Terhune, 
202 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Wheeler’s “‘strong likelihood’ . . . test was 
impermissibly stringent in comparison to the more lenient Batson ‘inference’ test”). 
49 See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 166. 
50 Id. 




formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Batson,” but that the standard was 
created by the Court and, therefore, not for each state to set.51 
Justice Stevens, this time writing for the majority, argued that the “reasonable 
inference” standard, and not California’s “more likely than not” standard, was 
appropriate because it fit Batson’s original intentions.52 California’s much stricter test 
was an “inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie 
case”53 because Batson had not intended “the first step to be so onerous” that a defendant 
would have to persuade the judge on the basis of facts that are often “impossible . . . to 
know with certainty.”54 The Court, in essence, held that the California standard was far 
more severe, and thus inappropriate because it made Batson challenges very difficult to 
raise from the outset.  
Under Batson’s first step, a party need only produce evidence sufficient to permit 
the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.55 In other words, the 
evidence need only be sufficient to support an inference that the disqualification was a 
result of purposeful discrimination, even though the Court failed to specify the kind of 
evidence that would establish a reasonable inference. To the Court, the standard requiring 
that a party merely raise a reasonable inference was appropriate because it allowed lower 
courts to hear “actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have 
infected the jury selection process” and, in doing so, performed the kind of oversight that 
Batson contemplated.56 Presumably, the Court believed that California’s “more likely 
than not” standard would prevent many claims from surviving beyond step one and 
would force judges to make the kinds of decisions at step one that were meant for step 
three. 
By mandating a lower prima facie threshold than California’s “strong likelihood” 
standard, the Court hoped to restrict California’s ability to alter the Batson test.57 The 
lower threshold would allow more Batson challenges to satisfy the first step and proceed 
through to the second and third steps of the framework. The actual impact of the decision 
appears minimal, however, because empirical studies show that even prior to Johnson it 
was not difficult to establish step one of the Batson test.58  
III. THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION: PAVING THE WAY FOR HERNANDEZ 
The Hernandez decision was certainly timely. Five years before Hernandez, in the 
midterm election of 1986, California voters passed Proposition 63.59 Proposition 63 
                                                      
51 See id. at 168. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 170. 
55 See id. at 170–71. 
56 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172. 
57 Id. at 170–73.  
58 See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory 
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 460–61 (1996) (examining Batson state and federal court 
decisions from 1986 to 1993). 
59 California Proposition 63, or the “English Is the Official Language of California” Amendment, was a 
state constitutional amendment that declared English as the official language of California after passing by 
a margin of 73% in the 1986 midterm election. This amendment has been interpreted as a political move to 
disenfranchise linguistic minorities. See Connie Dyste, Proposition 63: The California English Language 
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amended the state constitution to declare that English is the official language of 
California. The amendment resulted in the addition of the following passage to the state’s 
constitution: 
 
English is the common language of the people of the United States of 
America and the State of California. This section is intended to preserve, 
protect, and strengthen the English language . . . The Legislature and 
officials of the State of California shall take all steps necessary to insure 
that the role of English as the common language of the State of California 
is preserved and enhanced.60  
 
To date, thirty-one states, including California, have passed such “Official English” 
laws.61 The U.S. federal government, by contrast, has never declared English or any other 
idiom to be the nation’s official language.62  
Various other California statutes require that public activities be conducted in 
English alone, including the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires that English be used 
in all judicial proceedings.63 Interestingly, before Hernandez was decided in 1991, 
California’s Code of Civil Procedure already excluded potential jurors from serving if 
they were “not possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language, provided that 
no person shall be deemed incompetent solely because of the loss of sight or hearing in 
any degree or other disability which impedes the person's ability to communicate or 
which impairs or interferes with the person’s mobility.”64 In essence, a potential juror 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Amendment, 10 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 313, 314, 327–29 (1989) (The constitutional amendment was not 
merely symbolic but a political move to fight the use of languages other than English in California. Indeed, 
the amendment provides, among other things, a constitutional basis for challenging the legality of bilingual 
education programs and allows any person doing business in California to sue the state to enforce the 
amendment. Data from the California poll survey demonstrates that the strongest supporters of the 
amendment were whites, the less educated, and conservatives; the strongest opponents were Latinos, 
Asians, the highly educated, and liberals.); see also Susannah D.A. MacKaye, California Proposition 63: 
Language Attitudes Reflected in the Public Debate, 508 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 135, 137, 
144 (1990) (Although the purpose of Proposition 63 was to declare English as California’s official 
language, published commentary reveals a widely held belief that it was to ensure that English remain the 
common language of California, which would make clear to immigrants and other outsiders that they 
cannot “get along” in the United States without the benefit of English.).  
60 CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6(a), (c) (West 2012). 
61 See Official English Map, PROENGLISH.ORG, http://www.proenglish.org/official-english/state-profiles 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012).  
62 See Debate: English as US Official Language, DEBATEPEDIA, 
http://debatepedia.idebate.org/en/index.php/Debate:_English_as_US_official_language (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
63 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 185 (West 2012). It is important to note that California is not unique in 
requiring that English be used in all judicial proceedings, and this rule even holds in Puerto Rico. See, e.g., 
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, The Exclusion of Non-English Speaking Jurors: Remedying a Century of Denial 
of the Sixth Amendment in the Federal Courts of Puerto Rico, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497 (2011). 
However, there are exceptions, with states like New Mexico providing a contrast with California in 
requiring English language skills for jurors. See id.; Edward L. Chávez, New Mexico's Success with Non-
English Speaking Jurors, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 303 (2008). 
64 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203 (West 2012) (added by Stats. 1988, c. 1245). 




cannot be excluded in California solely on the basis of a physical or other disability, but 
can be excluded for lack of “sufficient” English language skills.65  
A disturbing aspect of these “Official English” laws is that they negatively impact 
multilinguals’ participation in jury service by excluding those who speak no English at 
all, as well as those who do not speak sufficient English to participate in jury service. 
While practical considerations exist that support the disqualification of non-English 
speakers from serving on juries,66 the problem with the California practice—and with 
others like it—lies in the difficulty of determining, in a non-arbitrary fashion, what 
constitutes English language sufficiency. For example, half of the California judges who 
participated in a language proficiency study said that “English sufficiency” meant being 
able to understand “broadly” what was said in the courtroom, whereas the other half said 
that it meant being able to understand “everything.” 67  
According to the 2010 U.S. Census, at the end of 2007, non-English-speaking 
Californians comprised 10% of the state’s population of individuals who speak languages 
other than English (43% of the state’s total population), while Californians who did not 
speak English well comprised 17% of that sub-group.68 The census data also reported that 
of those Californians who speak other languages, 53% could speak English “very well” 
and 20% could speak English “well.” 69 It is tempting to conclude that 73% of 
multilingual Californians who speak English “well” or “very well” provide a substantial 
pool of potential jurors for voir dire. California’s statutory exclusions, however, 
significantly reduce the multilingual jury pool because the exclusions bar Californians 
from serving on juries if they are not: (1) at least 18 years of age; (2) U.S. citizens; (3) 
deemed competent by reason of mental or physical infirmities; (4) residents of the county 
                                                      
65 Rule 203’s legislative history does not provide any reasons for this distinction, leading some scholars to 
call it “arbitrary” because the distinction incorporates neither a much-needed analysis of the goals of the 
court system, nor an assessment of the costs and benefits of having interpreters available for, e.g., the 
hearing impaired but not for non-English-speaking potential jurors. See Colin A. Kisor, Using Interpreters 
to Assist Jurors: A Plea for Consistency, 22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 37, 47 (2001). It has been argued 
that practical considerations exist in excluding individuals for lack of “sufficient” English language skills 
from serving on juries because: (1) “English is the language of the court proceedings and the secret jury 
room deliberations”; (2) Translators are not allowed in the jury deliberation rooms, and; (3) English 
preserves the uniformity federal courts seek. See Josh Hill, et al., Watch Your Language! The Kansas Law 
Review Survey of Official-English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 669, 710–11 
(2009). However, these arguments could also apply to jurors with hearing impairments. These arguments, 
moreover, fail to explain why courts must “differentiate between interpreters for the deaf and for non-
English speakers, when the two interpreters perform an identical function.” Kisor, supra note 65, at 51. 
Indeed, it seems “immaterial” whether an interpreter was “provided to translate orally in English or 
Spanish, or into sign language, or both, so long as the juror is able to understand the proceedings, and 
participate in deliberations . . . and [this view is further] reinforced if one subscribes to the viewpoint that 
the deaf are not handicapped, but instead are a ‘linguistic minority.’” Id. at 47. Although it is unclear 
whether this view is common among advocates, the point is that the courts should recognize on a functional 
level that there is no genuine difference between providing a court interpreter for a deaf juror or for a non-
English speaker.   
66 See Hill, supra note 65. 
67 See Jana Anette Radmann, Do You Speak English?: A Study On English Language Proficiency Testing of 
Hispanic Defendants in U.S. Criminal Courts, 63–64 (May 4, 2005) (master’s thesis), available at 
http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-04142005-224929/.  
68 Shin et al., supra note 3, at 9.  
69 Id. at 8–10. 
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in which they are to serve, and; (5) free from any felony convictions.70 The group that 
remains after this first round of disqualifications is further reduced because it includes 
low-income racial minorities who are either excused for financial hardship or who fail to 
respond to jury summonses because of their higher mobility relative to the overall 
population.71 This combination of factors produces an artificially small pool of linguistic 
minorities that is then further reduced by the exercise of peremptory challenges, which 
disproportionately target racial minorities.72 Although no study provides data showing the 
number of linguistic minorities excluded at each of these stages, studies do show that 
linguistic minorities continue to be underrepresented in California venires, as well as 
venires in many other jurisdictions.73 
                                                      
70 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 190, § 203 (West 2012). I only discuss those statutory exceptions relevant to 
this Article. Readers interested in viewing a complete list of California’s statutory exclusions should refer 
to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203 (West 2012).  
71 See CAL. CT. R. 2.1008(d) (potential jurors can be excused for undue hardship); Hiroshi Fukurai, Race, 
Social Class, and Jury Participation: New Dimensions for Evaluating Discrimination in Jury Service and 
Jury Selection, 24 J. CRIM. JUST. 71, 84–85 (1996) (racial and ethnic minorities, and those with low-income  
status, are underrepresented in venires); see also ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, IMPROVING CITIZEN RESPONSE TO 
JURY SUMMONSES 15, 120–124 (1998) (because minorities are underrepresented on voting rolls, they are 
underrepresented on jury rolls); HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY 45 (1993) (minorities’ low-
income status and involvement in secondary labor markets increases their mobility and, by extension, 
decreases their jury eligibility); Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury 
Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1055 (2003) (greater 
mobility, which causes low response rates to jury summonses, and financial hardship play an important role 
in minority participation in jury service).  
72 Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing A Jury That Is Both Impartial And Representative: 
Utilizing Cumulative Voting In Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 705–06 (1998) (arguing that 
although Batson was intended to remedy the striking of minority potential jurors, it has failed to deter the 
practice since minorities report to the courthouse at a lower rate, and are eliminated through peremptory 
strikes that employ race-neutral explanations). 
73 See Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Alameda County Jury Pools, ACLU OF NORTHERN CAL., 3 (2010) 
(Latinos represent 12% of the eligible jury pool but comprise only 8% of individuals appearing for jury 
service in Alameda, California); Lawsuit Thrown Out Over Underrepresented Latino Jurors,10NEWS.COM 
(June 12, 2008), http://www.10news.com/news/lawsuit-thrown-out-over-underrepresented-latino-jurors 
(Latinos represent 19% of the eligible jury pool in downtown San Diego, but only 9.4% of individuals 
actually appear for jury service); Final Report of the California Judicial Council Advisory Committee on 
Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts, JUD. COUNCIL CAL., Jan. 1997, at 193–95 (In Redding, California, 
Native Americans and Asians are almost never part of the jury pool. In Fresno, California, “[The jury pool] 
is clearly unrepresentative . . . in part because jury summonses are not enforced, and in part because the 
Department of Motor Vehicles list excludes those with suspended driver’s licenses as well as those without 
licenses, so that in some rural courts, where the population consists of more than 70% minorities, a jury 
with even one or two minorities is unusual.”); Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond & Marc A. Musick, 
Selected to Serve: An Analysis of Lifetime Jury Participation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 33, 45 (2012) 
(Latinos and Asians are significantly less likely than whites to have served on one or more juries in 
California and Texas); Ann Pfau, First Annual Report Pursuant to Section 528 of the Judiciary Law, CHIEF 
ADMIN. JUDGE N. Y. 16, 16 (2011) (Latinos in New York state were underrepresented by 39% in Nassau, 
22% in New York, 47% in Suffolk, 45% in Westchester, and 35% in Queens); Summoning Jurors, 
ARIZONA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/jury/jury1i1.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 
2012) (The 1993 report on jurors in Maricopa, Arizona “reveals that Hispanics were 61% 
underrepresented.”); Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas 
County, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 1813, 1815 (2001) (“Hispanic Americans represent 23% of the population in 
Dallas County but only 9% of the venire.”); Robert Walters & Mark Curriden, A Jury of One's Peers? 
Investigating Underrepresentation in Jury Venires, 43 JUDGES J. 17, 17 (2004) (“Latinos, the fastest 
growing ethnic community in the United States, are substantially underrepresented in the jury venires [of 




IV. CALIFORNIA’S FRAMEWORK FOR REMOVING POTENTIAL JURORS 
A. Challenges For Cause and Peremptory Challenges 
As in other states, parties in California may challenge potential jurors for cause or 
remove them through the exercise of peremptory challenges. Challenges for cause fall 
into two categories: implied bias and actual bias. Bias can be implied if a potential juror: 
(1) has an affinity to any party or witness in the case; (2) is related to the parties or to the 
victim; (3) has already served on a jury in which either party was present, or; (4) has an 
interest in the outcome of the trial.74 Actual bias exists if the potential juror’s “state of 
mind” prevents him or her “from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of any party.”75 An attorney challenging for cause must present 
evidence to show that the juror should be excused.76 The judge will then base the decision 
on the evidence submitted by counsel, which often includes consideration of information 
from counsel’s interview with the juror and counsel’s arguments. 
Potential jurors can also be removed by using peremptory challenges.77 A 
peremptory challenge allows each party to disqualify prospective jurors without having to 
provide a reason.78 In both civil and criminal cases peremptory challenges are limited, 
with the allowed number varying according to the gravity of the offense charged and the 
number of parties involved.79 Challenges for cause, by contrast, are unlimited.80 
Interestingly, nothing in the U.S. Constitution requires the states or the federal 
government to provide peremptory challenges. Nonetheless, peremptory challenges have 
endured since the earliest days of common law.81 Attorneys have often used them when 
mere “hunches,” “suspicions,” or “arbitrary exclusions” do not rise to the level of cause.82 
The U.S. Supreme Court has tried to respond to the dangers associated with peremptory 
challenges, which include violations of the Equal Protection Clause, by allowing parties 
to dispute their use under Batson.83  
                                                                                                                                                                 
Dallas and Harris, Texas].”); see also Final Report of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on 
Racial & Gender Bias in the Justice System, COMM. ON RACIAL & GENDER BIAS JUST. SYS. 54 (2003) 
(Pennsylvania jury selection mechanisms “fail at each step of the process to include a representative 
number of minorities.”); South Dakota Equal Justice Commission, Final Report & Recommendations, S. D. 
EQUAL JUST. COMM’N 8 (2006) (“Juries in South Dakota rarely represent the racial composition of a 
community.”); Where the Injured Fly for Justice: A Ten-Year Retrospect on the Report & 
Recommendations of the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission, FLA. SUP. CT. 
RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMM’N 13 (2000) (current jury selection mechanisms in Florida do not 
result in juries that “are racial and ethnic composites of the community.”); Final Report, MINN. SUP. CT. 
TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUD. SYS. S-14 (1993) (“[J]ury pools rarely are representative of the 
racial composition of [Minnesota] communities.”). 
74 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 229 (West 2012). I discuss only the general principles of implied bias; therefore, 
readers interested in viewing specific provisions of the statute should refer directly to CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 229. 
75 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 225 (West 2012). 
76 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 230  (West 2012) (“Challenges for cause shall be tried by the court.”). 
77 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 225(b)(2) (West 2012). 
78 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 226(b) (West 2012). 
79 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231(a), (c) (West 2012). 
80 Palacios v. Felker, No. CV 07-4470-RGK(JTL), 2008 WL 793373, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008). 
81 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212–13 (1965), overruled by, Batson, 476 U.S. 79. 
82 See Driver v. Trimble, No. C 10-2564 SI (pr), slip op. at 11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011).  
83 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 352. 
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B. Current Standard for Reviewing Peremptory Challenges 
As in federal court, a party in California state court that raises a Batson challenge to 
oppose a striking party’s use of a peremptory challenge must make a timely objection,84 
demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial 
group,85 and show that there is a reasonable inference that they have been challenged 
because of their race.86 The objecting party must allege that the strike is racially 
motivated and request the court to ask the striking party to justify its action. If the court 
finds that a reasonable inference of racial motivation exists, the burden shifts to the 
striking party to show that the strikes were not racially motivated.87 If the striking party’s 
explanation is not facially race-neutral, then the court dismisses the jury pool to start voir 
dire again or applies alternative judicial remedies.88 However, if the explanation is 
facially neutral, believable, and not a pretext for race, then the court will accept the 
explanation and the strike sustained.89  
As a first step, both federal and California state courts must determine whether a 
person or group fits into a “cognizable class” to have standing and assert a Batson 
challenge.90 First, the analysis involves whether the objecting party’s group is large 
enough that the general community recognizes it as an identifiable population. Second, 
the analysis considers whether the group is internally cohesive, based on attitudes or 
experiences that may not be adequately represented by other segments of society.91 
However, national origin, native language, and surname are not dispositive in 
establishing a person’s ethnicity.92 The trial court retains discretion to make this 
determination when an objection is made to a peremptory challenge.93 
Once the court determines that a person fits into a cognizable class, context-
dependent features of the case are considered to determine whether the likelihood of 
racial motivation exists. The types of evidence that may be relevant include whether: (1) 
most or all of the members of the identified group were excused; (2) a disproportionate 
number of peremptory challenges were exercised against the group; (3) the jurors in 
question share only one characteristic—i.e., their membership in the group—and are in 
other respects heterogeneous, and; (4) the failure to engage these jurors, as either a result 
                                                      
84 See People v. Morrison, 101 P.3d 568, 577 (Cal. 2004). 
85 See People v. Ramos, 938 P.2d 950, 964 (Cal. 1997). 
86 See Morrison, 101 P.3d at 577; Ramos, 938 P.2d at 964.  
87 See People v. Reynoso, 74 P.3d 852, 869 (Cal. 2003).  
88 See People v. Willis, 27 Cal. 4th 811, 819 (2002) (holding a court can declare a mistrial and discharge the 
jury venire, or apply alternative remedies if it chooses to do so, including assessment of sanctions against 
counsel whose peremptory challenges exhibit group bias and reseating any improperly discharged jurors if 
they are available to serve). 
89 See People v. Jurado, 131 P.3d 406, 421 (Cal. 2006).  
90 See Ramos, 938 P.2d 950 (Latinos);  In re Freeman, 133 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2006) (religious groups); 
People v. Cleveland, 86 P.3d 302 (Cal. 2004) (African-American women); People v. Gray, 104 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 848 (2d Dist. 2001) (African-American men). 
91 See Yee v. Duncan, 463 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2006); People v. Morris, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 872 (2d Dist. 
2003). 
92 See Ramos, 938 P.2d 950 (Latinos); Gray, 104 Cal. Rptr. 848 (2d Dist. 2001) (African-American men); 
Cleveland, 86 P.3d 302 (African-American women); People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78 (Cal. 2009) (religious 
groups). 
93 See Cleveland, 86 P.3d at 324 (trial court has wide discretion in conducting voir dire and retains great 
latitude in deciding what questions or factors to consider in voir dire). 




of desultory94 voir dire or a calculated decision on the part of the striking party not to ask 
them any questions.95 
In drawing an inference of discrimination from the fact that a striking party has 
excused “most or all members of a cognizable group,” the court, in finding a prima facie 
case, relies on an apparent pattern in the party’s challenges.96 However, such patterns are 
“difficult to discern when the number of challenges is extremely small.”97 Thus, detecting 
a pattern of discrimination is difficult in practice because, as noted above, linguistic 
minorities are already underrepresented in California jury pools. 
In any case, once the objecting party has established a prima facie case, the burden 
then shifts to the striking party to provide a race-neutral explanation for the exercise of 
peremptory challenges.98 Under Batson, a legitimate reason in this second step must be 
race neutral.99 The second step does not require an explanation that is persuasive or 
plausible; the issue is simply the “facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”100 
However, there will “seldom be much evidence bearing on the issue, and the best 
evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”101 
Thus, the determination comes down to a court evaluating the striking party’s state of 
mind, via demeanor, which “lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”102 
Under Batson, a striking party cannot assume in exercising peremptory challenges 
that because a prospective juror belongs to a cognizable minority group that the 
prospective juror holds views that are undesirable for the position.103 However, the 
striking party may excuse prospective minority jurors based on personal, individual 
biases even if these views or attitudes may be more widely held inside than outside the 
cognizable group.104 It is perfectly valid, for example, for a party to strike an African-
American juror because he or she has a bias against police officers, even though this view 
may be more widely held within the African-American community than outside it.105 A 
striking party’s justification for excluding linguistic minorities who respond 
“equivocally” is also race neutral when based on a distrust of these jurors’ ability to 
restrict themselves to the interpreter’s official English translation.106 Furthermore, a given 
juror’s demeanor or “body language,” which may include “alienating bare looks and 
gestures,” is a proper basis for disqualifying a potential juror.107  
                                                      
94 A party can demonstrate that his or her opponent engaged in desultory voir dire, which means that the 
opponent subjected potential jurors to inappropriate, unfocused, or random questioning before striking 
them from the jury pool. See People v. Fuller, 186 Cal. Rptr. 283, 293–294 (3d Dist. 1982), which 
illustrates this type of objection.  
95 See Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002); People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887, 905, 119 
(Cal. 1994). 
96 People v. Bell, 151 P.3d 292, 30 n.3 (Cal. 2007). 
97 People v. Bonilla, 160 P.3d 84, 104 n.12 (Cal. 2007). 
98 See id. at 103. 
99 See McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000). 
100 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). 
101 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. 
102 People v. Lenix, 187 P.3d 946, 955 (Cal. 2008).  
103 People v. Lewis, 140 P.3d 775, 812 (Cal. 2006). 
104 Id. at 812–813. 
105 See id. at 809–810. 
106 See People v. Lomax, 234 P.3d 377 (Cal. 2010). 
107 People v. Phillips, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678, 684 (3d Dist. 2007). 
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If a race-neutral explanation is provided, the trial court must decide, in step three, 
whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge has proven purposeful racial 
discrimination.108 In this third step, the plausibility or persuasiveness of the striking 
party’s justification becomes relevant and “implausible or fantastic justifications may 
(and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”109  
The trial court has a duty to determine the credibility of the striking party’s 
purported reasons for exercising the challenge,110 but the “burden of persuasion” to prove 
purposeful discrimination rests with, and never shifts from, the objecting party.111 Even 
when the inquiry is unfavorable, the objecting party must renew his or her objection 
before the jury is sworn to preserve the issue for appeal.112 In making its credibility 
determination with respect to the proffered reasons, the court must determine whether the 
striking party has given a “clear and reasonably specific explanation” of the reasons for 
exercising a peremptory challenge.113 The court must consider the “totality of the relevant 
facts,” including the striking party’s strategies and explanations, whether racial or non-
racial, for striking potential minority jurors.114 The court focuses on whether there is 
evidence to support the party’s reasons, no matter how reasonable these reasons may 
be.115 In essence, credibility is measured by how reasonable, or how improbable, the 
attorney’s explanations are, and by whether the proffered reason has some basis in 
accepted trial strategy.116 Moreover, evaluation of the striking party’s state of mind based 
on credibility “lie peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”117 To this the California 
Supreme Court has added the provision that, even though an appellate court can make a 
comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal to determine whether the stated 
reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge were pretextual, the appellate court must 
give great deference to the trial court’s ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent.118 
V. THE LESSONS OF HERNANDEZ IN JURY SELECTION 
A. A Study of California Case Law 
The recent Hernandez cases decided by California state and federal courts 
demonstrate that the pretext analysis remains arbitrary and perilous in practice, as judges 
try to peer into the hearts of striking parties to divine their true motivations for exercising 
peremptory challenges. These authorities reveal the reluctance of the appellate courts to 
disturb or question lower court determinations, and their willingness to accept 
                                                      
108 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 352. 
109 Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. 
110 McClain, 217 F.3d at 1220. 
111 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171. 
112 See People v. Hamilton, 200 P.3d 898, 925 (Cal. 2009) (party must communicate to the trial court any 
dissatisfaction with the jury selected to preserve the issue for appeal). 
113 Lenix, 187 P.3d at 954.  
114 Id. at 956, 958.  
115 Id. 
116 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 359 (2003). 
117 Lenix, 187 P.3d at 955. 
118 Id. 




implausible race-neutral explanations despite substantial evidence to the contrary.119 Only 
in truly egregious circumstances have courts been willing to grant Batson relief. 
In People v. Cardenas,120 a Latino defendant argued to the California Court of 
Appeal that the trial court had erred in overruling his Batson objection. The prosecution 
had used peremptory challenges to strike two Latino venire persons, Jurors A and B.121 
The prosecution’s proffered justification for the strikes was that she distrusted both 
jurors’ ability to disregard direct testimony in Spanish and follow only the English 
translation of the court interpreter.122 Although the trial judge “admonished” or warned 
both potential jurors and asked them to follow only the English translation—which both 
jurors agreed to do—the trial judge ultimately accepted the prosecutor’s “race-neutral” 
explanation for disqualifying both Latino venire persons.123  
The Court of Appeal admitted that evidence existed in the record that could 
“arguably support” a finding that the prosecutor was “insincere in her proffered reasons 
for excusing Jurors A and B.”124 First, the prosecutor’s “purported doubt” that the jurors 
would follow the interpreter’s translation, even after the trial court’s firm admonition that 
they must do so, “contradicts one of the basic tenets of our system of trial by jury which 
is frequently cited by attorneys for the People—the presumption that jurors ‘generally 
understand and faithfully follow instructions.’”125 Second, in Hernandez, the prosecutor 
based his peremptory challenges on “the specific responses and the demeanor” of the two 
multilingual jurors.126 In Cardenas, however, the prosecutor did not cite any specific 
aspect of the jurors’ demeanor that led her to doubt the credibility of their promise to 
follow the trial court’s instruction.127 Lastly, the fact that the prosecutor did not bother to 
question another Latino venire person, Juror F, about his ability to accept the translations 
provided in court was acknowledged as “some albeit . . . slight, evidence of the 
prosecutor’s intent to discriminate against Hispanics.”128  
The Court of Appeal, however, pointed out that a finding of “substantial evidence” 
does not necessarily imply that there is “no contrary evidence” that would shield the 
prosecution.129 Nonetheless, it failed to discuss any of this “contrary evidence.” Because 
                                                      
119 The Ninth Circuit defines substantial evidence as “more than a mere scintilla . . . but less than a 
preponderance,” which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990). The California Supreme 
Court defines substantial evidence as “evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” People 
v. Ceja, 847 P.2d 55, 58 (Cal. 1993). 
120 People v. Cardenas, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821 (2nd Dist. 2007). 
121 Id. at 824. 
122 Id. at 826. 
123 Id. at 824. 
124 Id. at 827. 
125 Id. at 828. 
126 Id. 
127 Cardenas, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 828. Although the court did not explain why this was evidence of the 
prosecutor’s insincerity, it probably viewed the prosecution’s failure to cite any specific aspects of the 
juror’s demeanor as evidence that the prosecution did not have any real basis for striking the juror during 
voir dire.  
128 See id. Likewise, the court did not explain why this was evidence of the prosecutor’s insincerity. 
However, the court probably viewed the prosecution’s failure to ask the juror about his ability to accept 
English translations—and then excusing the juror on that basis—as evidence of the prosecution’s 
discriminatory intent. See subpart VI(B) for more on a party’s failure to pursue further questioning.  
129 Id. 
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the trial court had concluded that the prosecution had put forth a “valid, race-neutral 
reason” for excluding Jurors A and B, and that this was the prosecutor’s “true reason,” 
the Court of Appeal held that the peremptory challenges were not a mere pretext to cover 
up intentional discrimination against Latinos.130 On the strength of these observations, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the Batson challenge. 
Cardenas exemplifies many of the difficulties with the pretext analysis. The 
striking party’s threshold of proof for offering race-neutral explanations is so low that 
plausible, run-of-the-mill justifications can be readily found or manufactured for striking 
almost any juror in almost any case. How is a trial court supposed to judge those 
justifications proffered by the prosecution? How is a judge supposed to read a 
prosecutor’s mind? How is an appellate court supposed to analyze the trial court’s 
credibility findings? How much deference should it accord to lower courts? How much is 
too much deference? As Cardenas demonstrates, the problems of analysis and 
implementation may be intractable even where the reasons proffered for exclusion are 
plainly unsound, undermined by “substantial evidence” of discriminatory intent, and 
acknowledged by the appellate court as such.  
Indeed, the implication supported by cases like Cardenas is that to survive a Batson 
challenge, the striking party need only say something that does not contain the word 
“race” and describes a lack of confidence in a given juror’s ability to ignore non-English 
testimony. In this environment, trial and appellate courts are hard-pressed to deem any 
peremptory challenge based on language classifications as a pretext for race-based 
exclusion, despite the pattern of strikes and other outward indicia131 of discrimination. 
In another case, Corona v. Almager,132 the Ninth Circuit addressed a deeply 
troubling Batson challenge. At Corona’s state court trial for attempted murder, the 
prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to strike the only two black venire persons. 
When the defendant raised Batson objections, the prosecutor stated that the primary 
reason he struck one of the jurors, Juror 28, was that the “juror had a strong accent [from 
which] the prosecutor inferred a lack of English proficiency.”133 Ironically, the trial judge 
was the “first to advance [the view] that juror 28’s accent was a reason to exercise a 
peremptory strike,”134 suggesting that the court was itself biased against the juror. 
Meanwhile, the prosecutor conducted no further inquiry into Juror 28’s language ability 
and “failed to ask follow-up questions.”135  
The Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of Corona’s Batson motion, citing the 
“considerable difficulty” the court and prosecutor had with the juror’s accent.136 Yet, the 
District Court record “supports the opposite inference—that the [juror] was proficient in 
English.”137 The juror read and answered questions perfectly in English.138 He spoke in 
                                                      
130 Id. 
131 See discussion supra subpart IV(B) and infra subpart VI(B), for examples of outward indicia and 
patterns of strikes that may establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  
132 Corona v. Almager, 449 F. App’x 672 (9th Cir. 2011). 
133 Id. at 674. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137 Corona v. Almager, No. CIV. 07-2117 BTM (NLS), 2008 WL 6926574, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 
2008).  
138  Id. 




open court using grammatically correct English, thereby strongly suggesting that “he 
spoke English proficiently, albeit with an accent.”139 There were no questions from the 
court reporter to signal an issue with the juror’s English,140 and “[n]either the prosecutor 
nor anyone else asked any questions [regarding the juror’s] . . . ability to speak and 
understand English.”141 Simply put, there are “no objective, factual grounds in the record 
which support the . . . conclusion that the prosecutor’s strike appropriately rested on [the 
juror’s] inability to speak or understand English sufficiently.”142 Nonetheless, the Ninth 
Circuit failed to acknowledge any of these points in its decision and simply concluded 
that nothing in the record “show[ed] that the trial court . . . ‘acted contrary to clearly 
established [Supreme Court] law in recognizing and applying Batson’s [framework].’”143 
With its decision in Corona, the Ninth Circuit afforded great deference to the state 
court despite substantial evidence showing the unreasonableness of the proffered reason 
for the peremptory strike. If the Ninth Circuit’s decision is accepted at face value, 
prosecutors will be permitted to strike any minority juror who speaks English with an 
accent—irrespective of whether the accent causes actual difficulty in understanding the 
juror’s speech. A fair reading of Corona is that the Ninth Circuit took largely on faith that 
the state court had gotten it right and, in the absence of egregious proof of discrimination, 
essentially swept aside troubling aspects of the issue presented by the District Court.144  
Such fact patterns are common in California case law. In People v. Jurado,145 the 
prosecutor challenged the juror’s language ability because the juror indicated that she was 
born in the Philippines, suggesting that English was not her first language and that she 
would have difficulty understanding spoken English. In People v. Vargas,146 the Court of 
Appeals affirmed a lower court’s denial of a Batson objection by a Latino defendant, 
where the prosecutor used a peremptory strike based on the juror’s ability to speak 
Spanish, even though the juror believed his English was good enough to fully engage in 
deliberations. In Vasquez v. Runnels,147 juror Liang possessed a level of proficiency in 
English sufficient to allow her to participate on the jury. However, the District Court 148 
held that trial courts have great leeway in deciding these issues and, as such, it could not 
                                                      
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143 Corona, 449 F. App’x 672 (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002)). 
144 Another example of a case exhibiting egregious proof of discrimination is U.S. v. Burton, 191 F.3d 461 
(9th Cir. 1999). In this unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision finding a 
prima facie showing of discrimination in the peremptory challenge directed against a Latino venire person. 
According to the court, there was “no indication in the record [to suggest] that [the juror] was having 
difficulty understanding or answering [in English] the questions posed to her, either orally or in writing.” 
Id. at *1. Further, the striking party revealed a clear bias against Latinos in its earlier challenge by claiming 
that “people who are Spanish-speakers or Hispanic . . . no matter how clear they are, they generally don’t 
understand legal concepts of the law.” Id.  
145 131 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2006). 
146 No. B207146, 2010 WL 119930 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010), cert. denied (2010). 
147 No. C 05–4669 MMC PR, 2011 WL 1496040 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011). 
148 Petitioner challenged in District Court the validity of a judgment obtained against him in California state 
court. 
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say whether the state court was unreasonable in allowing juror Liang’s exclusion or 
whether it violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights.149  
These California decisions reveal the potential arbitrariness of decisions concerning 
challenges based on language proficiency. They illustrate that the practice allows courts 
to accept implausible “race-neutral” explanations for challenges that, in reality, highly 
correlate with race. These decisions also show that the Batson standard is a perilous 
instrument that can be turned into “a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis” for 
disqualifying linguistic minorities.150  
Meanwhile, courts rarely grant Batson relief and do so only in truly egregious 
circumstances. In 2008, the California Court of Appeal, Third District, found such 
circumstances in People v. Gonzales.151 During voir dire, the prosecutor exercised four 
peremptory challenges on prospective jurors, all of whom had Latino surnames. The 
defense contested two of these challenges—for jurors J.C. and F.R.—compelling the 
prosecutor to give reasons for their disqualification.152 According to the prosecutor, the 
fact that they were “Spanish speaking” posed the risk that the jurors would ignore the 
official court translation.153 He added that juror J.C.’s youth, as expressed through the 
absence of marital and parental relationships, suggested that he had insufficient maturity 
to serve as a juror.154 
The Court of Appeal looked to the fact that the prosecutor failed to individually 
question any of the Latino jurors to determine their ability to accept only the interpreter’s 
translation of Spanish testimony.155 Indeed, there was nothing on the record to show that 
J.C. or F.R. would have problems accepting the interpreter’s English translation.156 The 
court observed that: (1) Spanish proficiency was not a race-neutral reason for excluding 
jurors J.C. and F.R;157 (2) the prosecution was, in effect, eliminating the “clearly Hispanic 
Spanish-speaking prospective jurors” who more closely identified with their ethnicity or 
national origin, and; (3) the prosecution offered no other reason that might have provided 
a race-neutral justification for challenging J.C. and F.R.158 There was also nothing on the 
record to support the prosecutor’s claim that J.C.’s youth prevented him from serving 
effectively as a juror.159 On these grounds, the appellate court denied the challenges 
against J.C. and F.R., concluding that the strikes amounted to nothing more than 
“stereotypical assumptions about Latinos or bilinguals.”160 
                                                      
149 Although both parties ultimately passed the juror for cause and not peremptorily, this case aptly 
illustrates appellate courts’ reluctance to disturb lower court decisions, and courts’ willingness to accept 
implausible race-neutral, language–proficiency explanations despite substantial evidence to the contrary.  
150 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005). 
151 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205 (3d. Dist. 2008).  
152  Id. 
153 Id. at 208. 
154 Id. at 213. 
155 Id. at 212.  
156 Id.   
157 Id. at 211 (agreeing with defendant that Spanish proficiency was not a race-neutral reason for excluding 
jurors J.C. and F.R.; because the exclusion of both jurors raised the same issues, the court only analyzed 
J.C.’s case). 
158 Id. at 211–12.  
159 Id. at 213.  
160 Id. at 211 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361).  




An interesting question that arises from the cases discussed above is whether the 
Gonzales court would have allowed the peremptory challenges if the prosecutor had 
questioned both jurors individually and they had answered that they would accept only 
the English translation. In Cardenas, the challenges were deemed acceptable largely on 
the assumption that the presence of such a question could be taken as an indicator of the 
prosecutor’s “true” motivations, irrespective of the answer that the prosecutor received.161 
This issue never arose in Gonzales. However, the unanswered question of whether the 
Gonzales court would have followed Cardenas and allowed the peremptory challenges, 
had the prosecutor asked the jurors about the translation question, renders Gonzales a 
somewhat hollow victory for those who want Batson relief applied to viably protect 
linguistic minority jurors’ rights.    
B. Case Law Findings: Batson’s Failure, Untempered Judicial Discretion, and 
Implausible Race-Neutral Explanations 
Despite occasional successes like Gonzales, the arbitrariness of the Batson analysis 
with respect to multilingual prospective jurors continues to plague objecting parties who 
bear the unusual burden of proving the striking party’s discriminatory state of mind. 
Indeed, proving states of mind is at best an elusive goal, yet in this context such a goal 
might be said to border on the impossible because discrimination—whether on the part of 
striking parties or of judges presiding over voir dire—may be either “conscious or 
unconscious.”162 Currently, moreover, striking parties need only provide “race-neutral” 
explanations, or explanations that are based on something other than race, to justify 
striking multilinguals.163 Indeed, the threshold has been so low in practice that striking 
parties can meet their burden of proof by offering almost any explanation.  
Trial judges must rely on credibility determinations where these explanations are 
concerned.164 Since they only have direct access to facts and statements, not mental 
states, trial judges must divine the truth or “genuineness”165 of the reasons proffered, 
which renders them “ill equipped to second-guess”166 what appears to be facially neutral 
reasons to uncover discrimination. Indeed, the Supreme Court has admitted that there 
                                                      
161 See Cardenas, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 824, 826, 828. 
162 Batson, 476 U.S. at 106. The distinction between “conscious” and “unconscious” bias is helpful to the 
extent it reveals that unconscious bias warrants attention because it poses a unique challenge for 
antidiscrimination doctrine and advocacy. The distinction is also helpful because people may be willing to 
acknowledge the possibility of unconscious bias within themselves, while vigorously denying conscious 
bias. The unconscious bias claim therefore facilitates a consensus that the race problem persists. See e.g., 
Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, 
and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009); see also Jean Moule, UNDERSTANDING UNCONSCIOUS 
BIAS AND UNINTENTIONAL RACISM, available at   
http://people.uncw.edu/browna/documents/UnderstandingUnconsciousBiasUnintentionalRacism.pdf. 
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that “bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting 
traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity 
and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country’s law and practice.” Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244, 300–01 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
163 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 353. 
164 Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 324 (credibility can be measured by “how reasonable, or how improbable, the 
explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy”). 
165 See Lenix, 187 P.3d at 965. 
166 Batson, 476 U.S. at 106. 
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“will seldom be much evidence bearing on the issue [of discrimination] and that the best 
evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”167 
Studies, however, have shown that determining neutrality or credibility based on 
demeanor is susceptible to great inaccuracies,168 and a party can easily present false but 
neutral reasons while putting forward an honest and proper demeanor.  
The fact that the race-neutral test relies on subjective criteria—the judge’s beliefs 
regarding the intent or mental state of the striking party—makes it all the more difficult 
to reach an objective result in which illegitimate forms of peremptory challenges are 
properly and consistently identified and rejected. Moreover, in states like California, 
where trial courts have substantial discretion in evaluating Batson issues because of the 
great deference accorded to them by reviewing courts,169 both trial and appellate courts 
become reluctant to make the stark findings of attorney misconduct necessary to declare a 
Batson violation.170 
The Supreme Court, meanwhile, has only compounded the problem. In Johnson,171 
where the court established the “reasonable inference standard,” the Court failed to 
explain what it meant by an acceptable inference of discrimination, leaving California 
with scarcely any guidance as to the type of evidence that would comport with its 
holding. Instead, California state courts escape constitutional scrutiny simply by using the 
same verbiage found in Johnson. They pepper their decisions generously with the term 
“race neutral,” but apply such language according to their own interpretation, allowing 
their opinions ultimately to comport with the Batson standard without actually changing 
their analysis post-Johnson.  
The confusion wrought by Batson and its progeny has generated substantial 
literature on peremptory challenges. Some scholars conclude that eliminating peremptory 
challenges is the ideal response because it would not only prevent discrimination against 
minorities in jury selection, but would also alleviate the confusion cultivated by the 
complex Batson case law.172 These scholars suggest that any value gained by allowing 
                                                      
167 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. 
168 See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075, 1082–88 (1991) (empirical 
evidence shows that demeanor can diminish rather than enhance the accuracy of credibility judgments). 
169 Lenix, 187 P.3d at 955.  
170 See People v. Jackson, 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 1250–51 (1996) (“The tendency of trial courts to deal 
perfunctorily with [Batson/Wheeler] motions may be understandable, given the press of the court’s 
business, but it also further underscores the importance of appellate review [because] ‘[e]ven the most 
conscientious trial judge can be misled by such extraneous pressures as a reluctance to dismiss the venire 
after some or all of the jurors have been seated, or a felt urgency to begin taking testimony in a trial 
expected to be lengthy, or a natural disinclination to disbelieve assertions of good faith made by an attorney 
in open court.’”) (citing People v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1105 (1989)).  
171 Johnson, 545 U.S. 162. 
172 See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned about Batson and Peremptory 
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 502 (1996) (based on his empirical study of court cases, Melilli 
concludes that peremptory challenges no longer serve a useful purpose); see also Morris. B. Hoffman, 
Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (1997); 
Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory 
Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge 
Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); Marvin B. Steinberg, The Case for Eliminating 
Peremptory Challenges, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 216 (1991); Brent J.  
Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
227 (1986). 




peremptory challenges to give effect to attorneys’ hunches, suspicions, or arbitrary 
predilections is promptly overridden because such a system can be—and, in fact, is—
easily manipulated to exclude minorities and other disfavored groups from jury 
service.173  
Advocates of peremptory challenges, on the other hand, could point to studies 
showing a strong correlation between a minority juror’s race and his or her decision not 
to convict, although other studies show an equally strong but opposite correlation.174 
Advocates posit that peremptory challenges provide “tangible” security by allowing 
attorneys to excuse jurors whom they believe—but cannot offer evidence to prove—are 
biased.175 They argue that peremptory challenges ultimately lead to fairer juries and 
reassure litigants that they have a say as to who judges them.176 These advocates also 
suggest other benefits to peremptory challenges, that is, that they prevent the 
unpleasantness of articulating concerns about juror bias and that they enable attorneys to 
swiftly remove jurors whom they have alienated through probing questions during voir 
dire.177 
Other scholars have compiled evidence to suggest that the effects of juror race are 
context–dependent, with juror attitudes and experiences serving as more powerful 
predictors of juror verdicts.178 Indeed, related research supports the view that giving force 
to stereotypes or hunches not only fails to produce less biased juries, it also results in 
juries that are more biased than randomly selected ones.179 In other words, striking 
                                                      
173 See supra text accompanying note 168.  
174 Compare Mark D. Bradbury & Marian R. Williams, Diversity and Citizen Participation: The Effect of 
Race on Juror Decision Making, 44 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 1, 13 (2012) (arguing that Latino jurors are more 
likely to convict) with Stephen P. Garvey, et al., Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 372, 382 (2004) (arguing that Latino jurors are less likely to convict than white jurors, but the 
difference between the two groups fails to reach statistical significance); see also Richard Seltzer, Scientific 
Jury Selection: Does it Work?, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2417, 2419 (2006) (noting that in one 
pornography case, there was a strong relationship between race and juror attitudes toward conviction, but in 
a similar case in a different jurisdiction, there was an equally strong relationship between these two 
variables in the opposite direction).  
175 See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Jury Selection, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 39, 63 
(1982). 
176 See id. (“Babcock argues that the peremptory challenge serves the valuable function of allowing 
defendants some additional choice in the jury that will decide their fate, a choice unfettered by the 
requirements of legal tests or rationales for exclusion.”).  
177 Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 554–55 
(1975). 
178 See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, The Jury in Practice: Avoid Bald Men and People with Green 
Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1180 
(2003); see also Tanya S. Taylor & Harmon M. Hosch, An Examination of Jury Verdicts for Evidence of a 
Similarity-Leniency Effect, An Out-Group Punitiveness Effect, or a Black Sheep Effect, 28 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 587, 597 (2004); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 545, 546-48 (1995). 
179 Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of Its Content and Effect, 18 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 498 (1994) (arguing that striking jurors based on stereotypes or hunches fails to 
produce a less biased jury, but results in juries that are worse than or, at best, similar to a random selection); 
see also Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 
717, 737 (2006) (demographic characteristics like race generally account for very little of the variation in 
verdict response); EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING THE DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF JURY AWARDS 87 (2003) (as in the criminal context, jurors’ characteristics have little to no effect in the 
civil context); Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on 
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potential jurors based on stereotypes produces a homogenous jury that denies a defendant 
a right to an impartial jury. All in all, by far the strongest indicator of juror verdicts is 
likely to be the evidence presented at trial.180 Nonetheless, the weight of tradition behind 
them and the reassurance that they provide to litigants probably mean that peremptory 
challenges will remain a fixture in jury selection. This likelihood poses an important 
challenge for California and for other state courts.181 After all, if existing doctrine and 
practice remain unchanged, Batson will continue to allow reliance on language as a 
pretext for race in jury selection, thereby disenfranchising racial and linguistic minorities, 
and undermining public perception of integrity in the judicial process.  
C. Ineffective California Laws that Heighten Hernandez’s Effect 
California’s constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, prohibits the use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race and declares the right of 
defendants to a trial by jury drawn from a representative cross section of the 
community.182 In practice, however, California state laws have not provided linguistic 
minorities with any greater or more meaningful protection than have federal laws in 
attempting to prevent discriminatory jury selection practices. While California’s venire 
selection mechanisms183 and Penal Code184 were amended to protect “representational 
due process values,”185 exclusion of multilinguals from jury service because of imagined 
language issues raises Sixth Amendment concerns, which these laws were meant to stay. 
In other words, while venire mechanisms and the Penal Code were amended to protect 
Sixth Amendment guarantees that allow an accused to “enjoy . . . a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury,”186 California has failed in this objective by allowing 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 673 (2001) (few if any juror characteristics are 
good predictors of jury verdict preferences and those characteristics that are related to juror verdict 
preferences have weak and inconsistent effects); REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, 
INSIDE THE JURY 149 (1983) (the relationship between demographic characteristics, such as race, and 
verdict preferences is weak).   
180 See Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 
13–14 (1987). 
181 U.S. Supreme Court opinions suggest that though there are problems with peremptory challenges, they 
are ultimately fair because the strikes of one party will always be offset or canceled out by the strikes of the 
second party. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 159 (1994) (In his dissent, Justice Scalia 
declares that “[t]his case is a perfect example of how the system as a whole is evenhanded” in its treatment 
of peremptories and other legal tools.).  
182 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all . . .”); CAL. 
PENAL CODE Section 904.6(e) (West 2012); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 755 (Cal. 1978) (citing 
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)) (“For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury 
service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it, but is 
at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.”), overruled on 
other grounds by Johnson, 545 U.S. 162. 
183 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all . . .”). 
184 CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6(e) (West 2012). 
185 Hobby v. U.S., 468 U.S. 339, 346 (1984). 
186 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court has also recognized the value 
of the representative cross section requirement via impartial juries. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 
762 (Cal. 1978), (“[T]he primary purpose of the representative cross section requirement . . . is to achieve 
an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of the diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from 
their group experiences.” When racial minorities are underrepresented on jury venires, “such interaction 
becomes impossible and the jury will be dominated by the conscious or unconscious prejudices of the 




Hernandez-based challenges to overwhelm its constitution, leading to the de facto 
restriction of jury service to monolinguals, who represent little more than half of 
California’s total population.187  
Indeed, disqualifying multilingual jurors based on language classifications violates 
state laws by producing juries that do not adequately reflect a broad or “representative 
cross section of the population.”188 These exclusions further violate a defendant’s right to 
a fair hearing because juries should be made up of one’s peers, and this point is 
particularly salient in light of the fact that most defendants are not monolinguals. 
Ultimately, such exclusions not only result in the infringement of personal or 
constitutional189 rights, but they also deny multilinguals the opportunity to participate in a 
vital aspect of civic life.  
While California’s venire laws have failed to protect multilinguals’ right to jury 
service, California’s “English Only” laws have reduced multilinguals’ participation in 
jury service by imposing an arbitrary standard that allows only those who speak English 
“sufficiently” well to participate in jury service.190 Overall, these laws have worked in 
concert to heighten the impact of Hernandez on multilinguals. Since Hernandez allows 
even those multilinguals who are fluent in English to be excluded on the basis of their 
multilingualism, the already-small pool of multilingual potential jurors is further 
diminished.191 All of these laws, consequently, reinforce each other and combine to 
facilitate the systematic exclusion of multilinguals from jury service.  
In light of the negative impact of Hernandez and the rest of California’s 
discriminatory framework on linguistic minorities, and the remote prospect of abolishing 
peremptory challenges, it is clear that there is a pressing need for special measures to 
protect multilinguals’ right to jury service and to encourage greater diversity in jury 
venires.192  
D. The Importance of Diverse Juries 
Jury diversity is especially salient in light of the fact that most U.S. jurisdictions 
today are both racially and linguistically heterogeneous. A diverse jury enhances the 
quality of deliberations by bringing together a range of perspectives to test the evidence 
and arguments in the case. A jury verdict, moreover, should reflect the community’s 
                                                                                                                                                                 
majority.”); see also People v. Bell,  778 P.2d 129, 167 (Cal. 1989) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only 
practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representation of . . . a variety of [racial] 
groups on the jury so that the respective biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will 
tend to cancel each other out.”).  
187 See Shin et al., supra note 3, at 8–10 (monolinguals represent 57% of California’s total population).  
188 CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6(e) (West 2012); see also supra text accompanying note 181. 
189 This paper will not revisit these constitutional issues, which have already been discussed by other 
authors. See H. Swift, The Unconventional Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury Selection, 16 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 295 (1996) (describing Hernandez as an indication that the Court has prioritized the peremptory 
challenge over the Equal Protection Clause); Andrew P. Averbach, Language Classifications and the Equal 
Protection Clause: When is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481 (1994) 
(suggesting a way for the Equal Protection Clause to protect linguistic minorities); Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 
(1993) (describing Hernandez as diluting the line of Batson protections). 
190 See Part III of this paper for a discussion of California’s “English Only” laws.  
191 See supra text accompanying note 72. 
192 See Part VI for suggested measures. 
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conscience if it is to be legitimate in the eyes of the community, and both the perceived 
and real accuracy of this reflection are enhanced to the extent that the decision makers are 
drawn from a fair cross section of that community.193  
Striking linguistic minorities from a jury because they are more likely to 
understand the witnesses’ original testimony arguably excludes the very people who will 
be able to understand the testimony most accurately and undermines the system’s 
ultimate goal of justice. After all, linguistic minorities’ ability to help correct translation 
errors and distortions can positively contribute to the truth-seeking function of a jury trial. 
Such exclusions, moreover, can harm linguistic minorities’ perceptions of the justice 
system, threatening their belief in its fairness and influencing others in the community to 
lose confidence in a system that tolerates discriminatory exclusions.194  
Allowing the exclusion of any potential juror on the grounds that he or she will 
bring the biases of a particular racial group into the jury room is to misunderstand the 
democratic task of the jury, which is precisely to represent the diversity of views held in a 
heterogeneous society. If the jury is balanced to accomplish this representative task, then 
as a whole it will be impartial, even if no one juror is perfectly so. Linguistic minorities’ 
participation in juries is especially important because their viewpoints can help stimulate 
discourse that might otherwise not be explored, even if the ideas considered are not 
ultimately accepted by the group. Although the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth 
Amendment’s fair cross section requirement does not extend to potential jurors’ 
viewpoints,195 empirical studies have shown that racially diverse juries are better decision 
makers than all-white juries: they exchange a wider range of information; demonstrate 
more complex thinking; are less biased, more thorough, and more competent; devote 
more time to discussing and resolving polarizing or uncomfortable topics; discuss more 
trial evidence; and, make fewer factually inaccurate statements in discussing the evidence 
than do all-white juries.196 In adding new perspectives, linguistic minorities thus 
contribute to a framework in which jury decisions are qualitatively better, even when 
these decisions are not actually different from what they otherwise might have been. 
Thus, minority participation is a valuable component in the interpretive process, and the 
participation of linguistic minority jurors encourages balance and impartiality during 
deliberations. 
Diverse juries also promote a positive social good that may go beyond the 
courtroom given that participants share their experiences and the products of their 
education during deliberations, which enables individuals of diverse backgrounds to learn 
to work together as equals.197 Within the judicial process, diverse juries positively 
influence the performance of attorneys, including their voir dire strategies, trial 
preparations, and presentations.198 Above all, diverse juries embody the ideals enshrined 
                                                      
193 See supra text accompanying note 181 for a discussion of the cross section requirement. 
194 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 406–09, 411 (recognizing that the jury and even the entire community may lose 
confidence in a justice system that tolerates discriminatory exclusions). 
195 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986). 
196 Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of 
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 598, 600, 606–08 
(2006). 
197 HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY 
SELECTION 16 (2003). 
198 Id.  




in both the U.S. and the California constitutions and must, therefore, be protected and 
ensured. 
VI. IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA FRAMEWORK 
A. Recommendations to Judges, Courts, and Litigating Parties 
Improving the application of California’s pretext analysis is necessary and requires 
that courts and litigants bear the following considerations in mind. From a trial judge’s 
standpoint, perhaps the most obvious remedy is meaningful judicial oversight of the jury 
selection process. A trial judge could ensure that several information-gathering tools are 
used in voir dire, including individualized and collective questioning of prospective 
jurors, written questionnaires to supplement oral voir dire, meaningful co-participation of 
judge and lawyer in questioning prospective jurors, and adequate time for parties and the 
court to implement such practices. In cases where voir dire is less dominated by the trial 
judge, the judge should still include an opportunity to ask at least a few individualized 
questions of potential jurors, all the while subjecting the attorneys to meaningful judicial 
oversight. Such practices can ultimately help the trial court assess whether the proffered 
“race-neutral” explanations for striking a given juror were a pretext for language-based 
racism.199  
When a trial judge decides a peremptory-related matter, he or she should be vigilant 
when applying each of the three steps of the Batson test, and should ensure that each step 
is properly and carefully considered and supported by the record. Because reviewing 
courts look to trial records when adjudicating Batson appeals, defects or a lack of 
evidence in the record could be a basis for remand. A trial judge should, therefore, 
include on the record both the reasons for the decision and any circumstances that were 
crucial to the determination. Moreover, a trial judge should neither rely on generalities 
nor resolve peremptory objections summarily, but should develop a record that clearly 
outlines the findings with respect to each Batson step so that an appellate court will be in 
a position to evaluate intelligently the soundness of the trial judge’s decision.  
For their part, appellate courts should not confer undue deference to trial courts in 
their review procedures. Because a meaningful multi-judge review is part of California’s 
design for deciding appeals involving its citizens and laws, the first step is to recognize 
that the rule of deference has important limits if California is to improve its application of 
the pretext analysis. Appellate courts should not invoke the rule of deference to avoid 
close analysis of difficult questions. Instead, they must carefully and thoroughly review 
the lower court’s decision along with its record and offer clear reasons and guidelines in 
stating their own opinions. After all, it is only from appellate opinions that trial judges 
learn the boundaries of their discretionary power. 
 Indeed, the California opinions discussed in this article illustrate the fact that 
appellate courts have fallen far short of satisfactorily defining or clarifying the notion of 
abuse of discretion. This would not be the case if appellate courts crafted guidelines that 
                                                      
199 Of course, with more information, an attorney is better prepared to offer a reason that sounds non-
pretextual. Indeed, certain voir dire techniques, such as sequestration of individual potential jurors, can 
provide more complete disclosures from jurors that could be used to justify striking the juror. See, e.g., 
Shari Seidman Diamond, et al., Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, 7 CORNELL J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 77 (1998). 
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could adequately prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. For example, 
appellate courts should start by recognizing that trial courts rely heavily on assessments 
of a striking party’s motivations when deciding Batson challenges. In response, appellate 
courts should require judges to specify the basis of their “motivational judgments,” and 
they could enforce this requirement by refusing to defer to the findings of lower courts 
that neglect to do so.200 In fact, appellate courts would likely become more sensitive to 
the need for abuse-of-discretion guidelines if they sat regularly as trial judges,201 for it 
would remind them that records often fail to convey important factors upon which cases 
should be decided. Ultimately, the rule of discretion need not contribute to discrimination 
against linguistic minorities if those who confer and review its application understand and 
remain sensitive to the dangers that it carries. 
In turn, striking parties should be required to articulate plausible, race-neutral, and 
specific reasons for each peremptory strike. If this were the case, and if review were more 
thorough and less deferential than at present, striking parties would be forced to accept 
the fact that they would be better served by assessing the attitudes and experiences of 
multilingual jurors than by making assumptions—or pursuing “hunches”—based simply 
on language or race. Objecting parties, for their part, must raise a timely Batson challenge 
by objecting during voir dire or before the swearing of the venire panel.202 The objecting 
party must also clearly specify the grounds for the objection. Failure to do so—either 
because the objection was general or because it specified a different ground than that 
raised on appeal—will neither weaken the peremptory strike nor preserve the issue for 
appellate review. Most importantly, the objecting party must pay close attention to the 
first step, or the prima facie prong, of the Batson analysis and support the objection by 
presenting evidence that is supported by the factual record.203 
 
                                                      
200 Although this measure would be an exception to the usual deference granted to trial courts on 
credibility-related judgments, it would address many of the issues discussed in subparts V(A) and (B) of 
this paper. However, in a recent decision, Ayala v. Wong, the Ninth Circuit held that an appellate court 
“cannot defer to the trial court where procedural error . . . has rendered the trial court’s determination 
unreliable.” 693 F.3d 945, 972 (2012) (Defendant’s counsel was mistakenly excluded from Batson 
proceedings, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to persuade the trial judge that the prosecutor was 
motivated by racial bias. The trial court also lost the vast majority of juror questionnaires, preventing the 
appellate court from engaging in proper comparative juror analysis.).    
201 While appellate judges may be reluctant to consider this suggestion because it would require more of 
their time, places like Mississippi have successfully implemented this measure. Mississippi allows 
appellate judges to pursue trial judge duties in an effort to save the state money, and appellate judges have 
appreciated this move since it would help them become “better” at their jobs by keeping them “in touch 
with reality.”  
Court of Appeals Judges Sit As Special Trial Judges, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JUDICIARY, 
http://courts.ms.gov/news/2005/01.06.05specialappt.pdf.  
202 See, e.g., U.S. v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1993) (admitting the defense presents “significant 
arguments” to establish a prima facie case of language discrimination, but denying these objections because 
they were neither raised in a timely manner, nor supported by a factual record); Guillen v. Scribner, No. 
CV 05-4519 VBF (JC), 2010 WL 2509416, at *27 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2010) (dismissing defense’s 
objections to the peremptory challenge because of “Batson’s inherent timeliness requirement”). 
203 See, e.g., Changco, 1 F.3d at 841 (stating that objections to peremptory challenges should be supported 
by the factual record). 




B. Recommendations for Developing the Factual Record 
This section presents recommendations for strategies that objecting parties should 
employ to show objective evidence that a prima facie case for discrimination exists. 
These strategies are recommended because their use increases the likelihood that the 
objecting party can overcome the striking party’s race-neutral explanation and show 
intent to discriminate under step three of the Batson analysis. However, as some of the 
recommendations included in this section relate to strategies that have not yet been 
formally recognized by California state or federal courts, this section should also be taken 
as an appeal to these courts to do so as soon and as definitively as possible to establish a 
more just and concrete framework within which parties can develop a factual record and 
support discrimination claims. 
First, California federal courts should follow state courts and the Eleventh 
Circuit204 in allowing objecting parties to present, where relevant, evidence of a historical 
pattern in which the striking party excused members of a particular group from the 
prospective jury pool in other, unrelated cases.205 This does not mean that counsel can or 
should be required to show that a striking party always excluded every member of a 
cognizable group over any particular period of time,206 but that evidence of any such 
pattern can contribute to a showing of intent on the part of the striking party to 
disenfranchise members of the cognizable group. At the same time, it must be noted that 
the California Supreme Court held that even if counsel successfully establishes the 
striking party’s pattern of excusal of all members of a particular group, which raises an 
inference of impropriety, it is not dispositive. In such instances, trial courts are expected 
to evaluate the strikes in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding these strikes.207 
Objecting parties should therefore be prepared to marshal other evidence that supports 
their discrimination claims.  
Second, the California Supreme Court should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead and 
allow state courts to consider comparative juror analysis as evidence for establishing step 
one, or the prima facie prong, of the Batson test. Comparative juror analysis considers 
whether the answers of challenged jurors were similar to, or different from, those of 
jurors who went unchallenged.208 The results of such an analysis can support an inference 
that differential treatment of individuals, if not based on different (individual) answers, 
may derive from their membership in racial or minority groups. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit 
has conducted comparative juror analyses sua sponte in a variety of cases and, by 
emphasizing the value of comparative evidence in preventing a court from unreasonably 
accepting racial motives as nonracial, it has implied that lower courts should do the 
same.209 As it stands, the California Supreme Court has limited the use of this analysis by 
allowing state courts to consider such evidence only during the third step of the Batson 
                                                      
204 See the Eleventh Circuit apply the historical pattern test in Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1220 (11th 
Cir. 1983). 
205 See the California Supreme Court apply the historical pattern test in People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887, 
903 (Cal. 1994). 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 Johnson, 71 P.3d at 280–81, overruled by Johnson, 545 U.S. 162. 
209 See Ali v. Hickman, 571 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) amended by, 584 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 361 (9th Cir. 2006); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 
2006).  
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inquiry.210 The Ninth Circuit, however, has argued that “[t]here is nothing that suggests 
that it is more difficult or less desirable to engage in such analysis at step one rather than 
step three of Batson.”211 
Third, counsel in state or federal proceedings should raise the issue of statistical 
disparities, with respect to the proportion of available minorities stricken from the venire, 
the disproportionate rate of strikes against minorities, or both.212 Moreover, since 
California courts have not specified the numerical data necessary to raise or support an 
inference of discrimination, they should adopt the Second Circuit’s approach in this 
regard. In its analysis, the Second Circuit differentiates the issues of challenge rate and 
exclusion rate.213 The challenge rate focuses on the proportion of peremptory challenges 
exercised against minority group members and the proportion of group members 
removed, whereas the exclusion rate focuses on patterns where group members were 
completely or almost completely excluded from the jury.  
In practice, the challenge rate compares the “total peremptory strikes against 
members of a cognizable racial group . . . to the percentage of that racial group in the 
venire.”214 The exclusion rate records the disproportionate number of peremptory 
challenges used to strike members of a cognizable racial group.215 The Second Circuit 
believes that the “distinction between the two types of challenges is an important one” 
because cases involving challenge rates are successful upon a finding of “substantial 
statistical disparity,” while cases involving exclusion rates “have typically included 
patterns in which members of the racial group are completely or almost completely 
excluded from participating on the jury.”216  
To establish a prima facie case, the Second Circuit has required a complete record 
for both the challenge rate and exclusion rate.217 First, to establish a prima facie case 
based on the challenge rate, “the record should include, at a minimum, the number of 
peremptory challenges used against the racial group at issue, the number of peremptory 
challenges used in total, and the percentage of the venire that belongs to that racial 
group.”218 In United States v. Alvarado,219 the prosecution’s challenge rate against 
minorities was 50% (three of six) in the selection of twelve jurors, and 57% (four of 
                                                      
210 Lenix, 187 P.3d at 950. 
211 Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2006). 
212 See People v. Neuman, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 719, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Paulino v. Harrison, 542 
F.3d 692, 703 (9th Cir. 2008); Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2002) (Prosecutor 
disproportionately struck four of seven (57%) Latinos, supporting an inference of discrimination. 
Prosecutor also struck the only two black venire members, which, standing alone, is not always enough to 
establish a prima facie case. However, prosecutor’s prior use of peremptory challenges against Latino 
venire members, taken together with subsequent strikes against the only two black venire members, 
additionally supported inference of discrimination.); Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir.1995) 
(finding prima facie case of discrimination to be established when the government uses 56% of its 
peremptory challenges against black venire persons, although black venire persons comprise only 30% of 
the venire population), overruled by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). 
213 See Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2009). 
214 See id. at 98. 
215 See id. 
216 See id. 
217 See Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2007). 
218 See id; Jones, 555 F.3d at 98. 
219 923 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1991). 




seven) in the selection of twelve jurors plus alternates.220 Because the court did not know 
the percentage of minorities in the venire, it used as a proxy the percentage of minorities 
in the population of the Eastern District of New York from which the venire was drawn 
(29%).221 The court reached the conclusion that “a challenge rate nearly twice the likely 
minority percentage of the venire strongly supports a prima facie case under Batson.”222 
In United States v. Franklyn,223 the government used half of its peremptory challenges 
against black potential jurors, who made up only one-eighth of the venire, establishing a 
prima facie case of discrimination.  
To establish a prima facie case based on the exclusion rate, “the record need only 
include how many members of that group were in the venire, and how many of those 
were struck.”224 In Jones v. West,225 the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike 
four of five black venire members not already struck for cause, establishing a pattern of 
prima facie case of discrimination. In Green v. Travis,226 though the court lacked precise 
data about the composition of the venire, the prosecutor used all of his peremptory strikes 
to remove black and Latino venire members and struck all black venire members not 
already struck for cause, establishing a pattern of prima facie case of discrimination. In 
Harris v. Kuhlmann,227 peremptory strikes that excluded all five black potential jurors 
established a pattern of prima facie case of discrimination, while in Tankleff v. 
Senkowski,228 peremptory strikes that excluded the only three black potential jurors 
constituted a sufficiently dramatic pattern to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  
Counsel in state and federal proceedings should also keep in mind that jury 
selection procedures may give rise to an inference of prejudice even if opposing counsel 
does not actively strike potential jurors. Counsel should consider whether the trial court 
might have allowed a jury shuffle that prevented a random selection of jurors. The jury 
shuffle is a tool commonly used in Texas criminal trials to change the seating order for 
the jury pool.229 Specifically, venire members’ names are reshuffled or rearranged, which 
affects the order in which these members are seated and therefore reached for 
questioning. The jury shuffle has been considered problematic 230 because once the order 
is established, the panel members seated at the back are likely to escape voir dire 
altogether, for those not questioned by the end of the week are dismissed.231 In essence, 
the jury shuffle has been used as a tool to deliberately move racial minorities to the back 
of the venire panel where they are less likely to be considered and selected. Indeed, 
California’s own version of jury shuffling is already admissible as evidence of bias and 
                                                      
220 Id. at 255. 
221 Id. at 255–56. 
222 Id. at 255. 
223 No. S1 96 CR. 1062 (DLC), 1997 WL 334969 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997) aff'd, 157 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
224 See Jones, 555 F.3d at 99; Harris v. Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d 330, 345–46 (2d Cir. 2003). 
225 555 F.3d 90. 
226 414 F.3d 288 (2d Cir. 2005). 
227 346 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2003). 
228 135 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1998). 
229 See Blanton v. Quarterman, 543 F.3d 230, 242 (5th Cir. 2008). 
230 William v. Dorsaneo III et al., TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE: TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE § 2.01(E)(1) 
(2010) (discussing criticisms of the jury shuffle in racial contexts). 
231 Id. at 242. 
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procedural abuse.232 To the extent that a jury shuffle occurs in the venire selection 
process and that counsel believes such a shuffle has defeated the random selection of 
potential jurors, counsel should raise this procedural challenge. Courts should then 
consider whether the departure from a random selection excluded linguistic minorities 
from participating in voir dire. 
Finally, state and federal courts should consider allowing evidence of a striking 
party’s failure to pursue further questioning as a legitimate element in raising a prima 
facie case of discrimination.233 Indeed, asking few or no follow-up questions regarding a 
juror’s English proficiency and then excusing that juror on the basis of a perceived 
“insufficiency” is, as common sense dictates, counterintuitive and may well raise an 
inference that something else—namely, discrimination—is at work. However, courts may 
be reluctant to pursue this line of reasoning because the striking party can always claim 
that the decision to ask few or no follow-up questions was warranted based on the juror’s 
questionnaire or existing voir dire answers, and that further questioning would have been 
unnecessary or a waste of time. Therefore, it may be appropriate in practice to combine a 
failure to pursue further questioning with one or more of the other types of evidence 
discussed above, e.g.,: (1) a statistical disparity analysis, such as one in which the striking 
party is shown to have removed the only remaining linguistic minority from the panel; or 
(2) a comparative juror analysis that demonstrates that the responses of those jurors who 
were excused were not substantially different from those of other jurors who were 
allowed to serve. Such combined use can overcome the aforementioned objection and, 
thus, allow this common and significant type of evidence to play a role in establishing an 
overall case for discrimination. 
C. Recommendations for the California Legislature 
First, state legislators should reconsider California’s “Official English” laws. Sadly, 
these laws have exacerbated the negative impact of Hernandez and resulted in the 
                                                      
232 See CAL. CIV. PROC. § 222(b) (West 2012) (court shall seat prospective jurors in random order); Woods 
v. Scribner, No. 1:02CV05894-JKS, 2007 WL 852184, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007) (court 
acknowledges that “shuffling of juries to place white [jurors] ahead of black jurors” is evidence of pretext); 
see also People v. Mayfield, 928 P.2d 485, 519 (1997) (Jury ordering or shuffling procedures that 
unnecessarily narrow a jury pool are disfavored. Courts should, therefore, strictly adhere to statutory 
provisions designed to provide defendants with juries constituting as nearly as reasonably possible a 
random cross section of the community.); People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 404–09 (1992) (Defendants 
have a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community. To show 
that this right was violated, a defendant must demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to seat prospective 
jurors randomly affected his or her ability to select a jury drawn from a representative cross section. In 
other words, a defendant must show that the jury selection procedure prevented a random selection of 
jurors and, thus, held the potential for abuse or appearance of partiality.); People v. Wright, 802 P.2d 221, 
238–41 (1990) (Jury ordering or shuffling procedures used to select prospective jurors for voir dire do not 
deny a defendant his right to a randomly selected jury if: (1) selection was not undertaken by a single 
person, (2) there was no evidence that these prospective jurors were aware that the order in which they 
entered the courtroom or were seated would determine whether they would be included in voir dire, and (3) 
defense counsel was able to fully question them and exercise his peremptory challenges in an informed 
manner). 
233 Indeed, the Supreme Court has already recognized that “disparate questioning” of venire persons can 
raise a reasonable inference of discrimination. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 234. People v. Gonzales, 
discussed in subpart V(A) of this paper, also offers a good rationale for why a failure to pursue further 
questioning should be considered in raising a prima facie case of discrimination. 




disenfranchisement of linguistic minorities from jury service. Indeed, it is ironic that, 
although it is clearly and demonstrably the case that linguistic minorities are 
underrepresented in jury service, obstacles are thrown in their path that effectively 
prevent them from exercising their civic duty. Thus, California legislators should (1) 
consider abolishing discriminatory Official English laws; and (2) allow state courts to 
expand their existing infrastructure so that they can better accommodate linguistic 
differences in the full spectrum of courtroom activity, including jury composition. For 
example, under the California Rules of Court, Rule 985, which governs interpreter 
services in the courts,234 the corps of courtroom interpreters could be expanded to 
accommodate those jurors who, in the court’s view, do not possess “sufficient” English 
skills. This accommodation could also be extended to non-English-speaking citizens.  
Second, state legislators could consider allowing convicted felons to participate in 
jury service.235 Convicted felons in California must be pardoned by the Governor to have 
their civil rights restored so they can participate in jury service.236 However, not all felons 
are eligible for pardon and237 even for those who are, state law mandates procedures that 
make it extremely difficult for felons to shed their status.238 This is especially troubling 
                                                      
234 See e.g., CAL. JUD. ADMIN. R. 10.51 (West 2012). 
235 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203(a)(5) (West 2012) (disqualifying from jury service those who have 
been convicted of a felony). One common argument against including convicted felons as jurors is that they 
are “inherently biased,” and allowing them on a criminal jury would deny a criminal defendant the right to 
an impartial jury. Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 71 
(2003). However, some scholars counter that defining felons as “inherently biased is inconsistent with 
[court] decisions affirming verdicts rendered by juries with felons,” and that exclusions are often applied 
over-inclusively in states that allow clemency felons to serve. Id. at 85. Based on a 2003 study, thirty-one 
states exclude felons from serving on juries for life, unless their rights are restored pursuant to discretionary 
clemency rules. Id. at 157. However, two states—Maine and Colorado—do not exclude convicted felons 
from serving on juries. Id. at 158.  
236 See California Courts: The Judicial Branch, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/3953.htm#felon (last visited Feb. 20, 2012); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil 
Disabilities of Convicted Felons: A State-By-State Survey, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE 
SERVICE, 29–30 (Oct. 1996) https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/195110.pdf.   
237 See California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, HOW TO APPLY FOR A PARDON: STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BOPH/docs/apply_for_pardon.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2012).   
238 See e.g., COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, EXPUNGEMENT, available at 
http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/public_defender/expungement.html. Under California law, expunging a felony 
conviction requires the individual to attend a formal court hearing regarding his or her expungement, with 
the presiding judge having complete discretion over the matter. Id. Therefore, the hearing may require 
calling witnesses, filing legal declarations, and preparing additional information for the court about the 
individual’s particular circumstances. This requires money, time, and a good attorney. Indigent individuals 
can seek assistance from the Public Defender’s Office and apply for a filing fee waiver, but these resources 
are subject to eligibility. Id. Under California law, moreover, expungement is just the first step toward 
obtaining a pardon for a felony conviction. Id. California Penal Code 1203.4 also makes clear that the 
felony case is not sealed, but simply “dismissed,” which means that the conviction remains on the record. 
Thus, there are numerous limitations to expungements. See also Samara Marion, Justice by Geography - A 
Study of San Diego County's Three Strikes Sentencing Practices from  
July–December 1996, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 29 (1999) (California’s three strikes law allows non-
violent offenses to be elevated to a felony and to be tried as a second or even third felony strike, 
dramatically increasing the number of felons in the state).   
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since over 165,000 Californians are in jails and prisons,239 with racial minorities 
constituting 73% of the male prison population and 52% of the female prison 
population.240 In fact, Latinos alone comprise 38% of male prisoners, 28% of female 
prisoners, and 64% of all foreign-born prisoners.241 These numbers suggest that racial 
and linguistic minorities are disproportionately represented in jails and prisons, and that 
felon jury exclusion may be a strong contributor to the low incidence of racial and 
linguistic minorities serving on California juries. However, if convicted felons who have 
completed their sentences are made eligible for jury service, legislators and courts would 
also need to establish procedures to mitigate against convicted felons being challenged 
and dismissed disproportionately; otherwise, the positive impact on jury diversity could 
be severely undercut. 
Finally, state legislators should allow non-county residents to participate in jury 
service.242 Given the exceptional mobility of California’s low-income minorities,243 
allowing individuals to serve regardless of their county residence status would 
significantly increase the pool of linguistic minorities eligible for jury service. Indeed, a 
study based on 1999 to 2000 showed that approximately 16% of Californians were 
disqualified from jury service,244 and that the second “most common reason for 
                                                      
239 Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison & William J. Sabol, Prisons in 2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
14 (2011) http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf.  
240 Amanda Bailey & Joseph M. Hayes, Who’s in Prison? The Changing Demographics of Incarceration, 8 
PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. 1, at 4 (2006), http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=701 (last visited Feb. 
20, 2012).   
241 Id. at 6.  
242 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203 (West 2012) (persons are disqualified from jury service if they are not 
residents of the county or jurisdiction wherein they are summoned to serve). The proposal to allow non-
county residents to participate in jury service is in keeping with the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage clause 
that provides an accused with an impartial jury in his or her vicinage. See Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 
1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not decided whether the Sixth Amendment’s 
vicinage clause applies to the states. Nor has the Court defined the scope of a state defendant’s federal 
vicinage rights, such as what constitutes the ‘district’ in the state context or whether the vicinage 
requirement allows a crime committed in two different countries to be tried by a jury drawn from either 
one.”). No state has yet applied the measure suggested by the author here, probably due to the associated 
costs of having to track county and non-county residents for jury summonses. However, this measure 
would provide greater incentive for a state to improve the representativeness of registration lists and source 
lists from which the names of prospective jurors are drawn. Indeed, a 2002 study examining California 
juries reports that over 16% of jury summonses and affidavits were undeliverable due to inaccurate state 
address records. Daniel Klerman, A Look at California Juries: Participation, Shortcomings and 
Recommendations, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, at 6 (Sep. 2002), available at 
http://lawweb.usc.edu/users/dklerman/PDFs/A%20Look%20at%20California%20Juries%20Participation%
20Shortcomings%20and%20Recommendations.pdf. This highlights the need for California to take serious 
and immediate steps to improve their lists to successfully track potential jurors.    
243 HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY in THE PLENUM SERIES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 45 (James 
A. Fox et al. eds. 1993) (minorities’ low-income status and involvement in secondary labor markets 
increases their mobility and, by extension, decreases their jury eligibility); Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman 
Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1033, 1055 (2003) (greater mobility, which causes low response rates to jury summonses, and 
financial hardship play an important role in minority participation in jury service). 
244 Daniel Klerman, A Look at California Juries: Participation, Shortcomings and Recommendations, AM. 
TORT REFORM ASS’N, at 6 (Sep. 2002), available at 
http://lawweb.usc.edu/users/dklerman/PDFs/A%20Look%20at%20California%20Juries%20Participation%
20Shortcomings%20and%20Recommendations.pdf.  




disqualification . . . [was] non-residence in . . . [the California] county that summoned 
them.”245 Thus, lifting the county residence requirement for jury service would help to 
offset the negative impact of socioeconomic constraints on minorities’ exercise of civil 
rights by enabling more extensive participation on the part of members of linguistic and 
other minority groups, who are currently underrepresented in the jury selection process. 
D. Recommended Jury Instructions Regarding “Official” English Translations 
The Ninth Circuit currently offers a manual on criminal jury instructions for use by 
district courts.246 This manual contains, among others, a model jury instruction with 
respect to official English translations.247 The instruction is as follows: 
 
§ 1.12. Jury to be Guided by Official English Translation/Interpretation. 
 
[A language] [Languages] other than English will be used for some 
evidence during this trial. [When a witness testifies in another language, 
the witness will do so through an official court interpreter.] [When 
recorded evidence is presented in another language, there will be an 
official court translation of the recording.] 
 
The evidence you are to consider and on which you must base your 
decision is only the English-language [interpretation] [translation] 
provided through the official court [interpreters] [translators]. Although 
some of you may know the non-English language used, you must 
disregard any meaning of the non-English words that differs from the 
official [interpretation] [translation].  
 
[You must not make any assumptions about a witness or a party 
based solely upon the use of an interpreter to assist that witness or 
party.]248  
 
Although the final sentence above rightly instructs jurors to avoid making inappropriate 
assumptions about a witness or party based on the fact that the court requires the witness 
to depend on a court interpreter (i.e., based on his or her status as a multilingual or non-
English speaker) to prevent juror bias, the premise of requiring jurors to restrict 
themselves to a specific translation of a language that they understand is fundamentally 
                                                      
245 Id. at 10.  
246 See Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions: Criminal, 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3.1 (2010), 
available at 
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/d4f8f49f20ea8ab3882564bb000fc20d/$FILE/1_2012_F
inal_Criminal.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). The Ninth Circuit also offers an instruction for English 
translations in civil cases. However, because this instruction is a diluted version of the criminal instruction, 
I focus my discussion only on the latter. See manual for civil instructions at Ninth Circuit Manual of Model 
Jury Instructions: Civil, 9TH CIR. CIV. JURY INSTR. 3.1 (2007), available at 
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/1ae2dda702db203388256aae0064d796/$FILE/1_2012
%20final%20civil.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).  
247 See Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions: Criminal, 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3.1 at 14 
(2010) (§ 1.12: Jury to be Guided by Official English Translation/Interpretation). 
248 See id. at 14. 
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flawed. Indeed, this insistence obviates the use of a linguistic resource present in court—
namely, the jurors—to act as a check on the official translation’s veracity or accuracy. At 
present, no mechanism exists to take advantage of this dynamic. In other words, forcing 
multilingual jurors to accept only the court interpreter’s translation prevents them from 
directing the court’s attention to questionable or outright erroneous translations, which 
then become part of the trial record and part of the basis for the jury’s determination. 
As noted above, the notion that jurors faithfully and infallibly follow court 
instructions is a methodological premise and a procedural goal, not a perfect reflection of 
reality. The idea that multilingual jurors can simply “disregard” any meanings of non-
English words that differ from the court interpreter’s translation is an excellent example 
of this disparity. The present system of depriving multilingual jurors of the opportunity to 
openly consider and perhaps correct what they perceive to be misleading or erroneous 
translations is likely to result in these jurors feeling frustrated or confused by the 
discrepancy between what they know or believe to be true and what they are told by the 
court.249 By contrast, instructing juries to raise any issues related to questionable or 
erroneous translations at the end of a witness’s testimony has a number of benefits. First, 
the practice would foster greater accountability among court interpreters, incentivizing 
them to provide more accurate translations (and may actually be instructional to court-
appointed interpreters—making them better). Second, this change would enable 
multilingual jurors to make an added contribution to truth and accuracy in the judicial 
process. Finally, it would obviate the concerns about multilingual jurors exerting an 
undue influence over their peers when deliberating matters involving translated 
testimony, since translation issues would have already been dealt with during the course 
of trial. 
Indeed, this issue illustrates the fact that multilinguals are not only presently 
underrepresented in jury service, their limited participation is undervalued and under-
utilized. Beyond allowing multilinguals to contribute their linguistic expertise to 
determining what was or was not stated by witnesses, permitting the firsthand 
consideration of non-English testimony would enable multilingual jurors to better fulfill a 
core juror function: evaluating a witness’s credibility. By considering such testimony 
directly, in other words, jurors with the appropriate language skills and cultural 
background can evaluate more meaningfully the witness’s use of language, demeanor, 
gestures, and other non-verbal expressions that are part of the communication system in 
any linguistic sub-culture, that typically defy translation, and that can be crucial to 
making accurate credibility determinations.250 Nuance and demeanor, for example, can 
greatly affect the meaning that a witness wishes to convey, as well as a juror’s 
understanding of the witness’s intent.251 Court interpreters may try to account for such 
                                                      
249 One argument against allowing jurors to disagree with the court reporter’s interpretation is to promote 
uniformity and efficiency of the judicial process because all jurors will be instructed to accept only the 
court interpreter’s testimony without question. However, this argument is unsatisfying and highly 
problematic for the reasons discussed in this section.  
250 See Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 
1129–31, 1135 (2000) (jurors are instructed and expected to evaluate all aspects of a witness’s testimony, 
including the credentials via demeanor and other non-verbal expressions). 
251 Id. at 1169–70. 




factors in the translations that they provide; however, even highly trained interpreters are 
likely to be unable to fully capture these subjective aspects of a witness’s testimony.252  
In this regard, providing a legitimate role for multilingual jurors’ firsthand 
observations regarding the nuances of a witness’s use of language or gestures would have 
a considerable impact on closing the gap between the handling of non-English testimony 
and the evidentiary rule against hearsay.253 The hearsay rule excludes out-of-court 
statements because a “witness under oath, subject to cross-examination, and whose 
demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact, is a reliable informant.”254 Strictly 
speaking, this rule could be invoked to question the use of interpreted testimony, which 
stands at a distance from any “demeanor . . . observed by the trier of fact.” Input from 
multilingual jurors on the role of demeanor and related nuances, from this standpoint, 
should therefore not be systematically ignored, but should be openly valued and solicited. 
In fact, California’s jury instruction on English translations offers, in the final line 
of the passage quoted below, a corrective to the Ninth Circuit model:  
 
§ 121. Duty to Abide by Translation Provided in Court. 
 
Some testimony may be given in [insert name or description of 
language other than English]. An interpreter will provide a translation for 
you at the time that the testimony is given. You must rely on the 
translation provided by the interpreter, even if you understand the 
language spoken by the witness. Do not retranslate any testimony for other 
jurors. If you believe the court interpreter translated testimony incorrectly, 
let me know immediately by writing a note and giving it to the 
(clerk/bailiff).255 
 
However, based on the above discussion, the following modified version of jury 
instruction should be considered as preferable (proposed changes shown in italics): 
 
Some testimony may be given in [insert name or description of 
language other than English]. An interpreter will provide a translation for 
you at the time that the testimony is given. You may be able to understand 
the language spoken by the witness. As jurors we expect you to draw on 
your common sense and experience in evaluating witness testimony. If you 
believe the court interpreter translated testimony incorrectly, let me know 
                                                      
252 One could argue that the ideal situation would be to have only those jurors who understand fluently both 
English and any other language used at trial. However, this would violate the Sixth Amendment’s 
“representative cross-section requirement,” and deprive a defendant of his or her right to a fair hearing by 
an impartial and diverse jury that is made up of his or her peers.   
253 See FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is inadmissible”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 2012) (“Except as 
provided by law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible”). 
254 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (emphasis added). 
255 See Criminal Jury Instructions: CalCrim 2012, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA (2012), at 22, 
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/calcrim_juryins.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). 
California’s criminal instruction on English translations was first introduced in January 2006, id., and is an 
exact replica of California’s civil instruction, § 108, that was introduced in September 2003. See Civil Jury 
Instructions: CACI, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA (2011), at 24, available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/caci_2012_edtion.pdf  (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).    
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immediately by writing a note and giving it to the (clerk/bailiff) and 
refrain from retranslating any of the testimony for or in the hearing of 
other jurors until such matters are resolved. 
 
In its present form, California’s instruction rightly provides jurors with a judicially 
sanctioned channel through which to raise translation concerns.256 The instruction, 
however, suffers from the same problem as the Ninth Circuit model in that it insists that 
jurors rely only on the court interpreter’s translation. The implication is that the 
acceptance of an official interpretation would lead to greater objectivity in judgment. 
However, no data exist to support this conclusion. Moreover, this implication may be 
expected to discourage multilingual jurors from bringing language issues to the court’s 
attention, despite the invitation to do so, particularly in light of the fact that the present 
instruction specifically bars them from sharing relevant observations and perceptions 
with their fellow jurors at any time.257 The proposed revision, therefore, restates jurors’ 
potential understanding of non-English testimony in neutral or positive terms and leaves 
open the possibility that such jurors may discuss this understanding with, or in the 
hearing of, their peers at the appropriate time. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Examination of California case law in the twenty years since Hernandez 
demonstrates that the pretext analysis for linguistically motivated peremptory challenges 
remains both an arbitrary and a flawed tool that courts have, nevertheless, been reluctant 
to second guess. The goal of voir dire is to elicit meaningful information about 
prospective jurors’ ability to weigh the facts of a case and the arguments of litigating 
parties, with fairness and impartiality, and Hernandez has failed to further this goal. The 
resulting situation, in which language-based exclusions are widely allowed, denies 
linguistic minorities their right as members of the community to serve on juries and, thus, 
to participate in an important aspect of civic life. Language-based exclusions also deprive 
litigants and the courts of diverse juries that are demonstrably better decision makers, and 
that practice balance and impartiality during deliberations.  
These exclusions ultimately affect not only individuals and minority groups, but 
society as whole. Indeed, the systematic pattern of exclusion caused by the legal 
mechanisms, practices, and associated factors discussed in this paper yields juries that do 
not adequately reflect a representative cross section of California’s population. Moreover, 
an examination of this issue in other states and localities likely presents the same weighty 
concern.  
In the end, the abolition of the peremptory challenge may be the ideal response to 
this quandary. Given the remoteness of this possibility at the present time, however, it is 
clear that there is a pressing need for careful review of Hernandez, and for the crafting of 
practical and workable remedies that can limit its negative impact on juries not only in 
California, but other jurisdictions as well. The suggestions proffered in this Article are 
                                                      
256 The instruction for multilinguals not to retranslate testimony for other jurors is based on People v. 
Cabrera, 230 Cal.App.3d 300, 305 (2d Dist. 1991) (the actions of bilingual jurors in retranslating the 
official testimony is “misconduct”). 
257 Id.  




not intended to be exhaustive. They can, however, provide a starting point in offering 
options and alternatives for use by attorneys and courts, as well as in suggesting 
directions that might be taken by state legislatures. The latter, after all, have the power to 
shape state laws so that they better support the equitable representation of all members of 
their diverse citizenry. Legislative action designed to more effectively represent speakers 
of languages other than English in the state’s population and on juries would further this 
goal by improving the representative nature of jury composition, as well as affording 
protection to linguistic minorities’ civil rights. 
